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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers an analytical survey of evaluations of the effectiveness of the 
U.S-sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The CTR remains the 
principal source of U.S.-Russian interactions regarding WMD proliferation. Russia's 
internal problems, including political, economic, military and social instability, have 
created the risk that rogue states or terrorists may attempt to exploit the uncertainties in 
Russia to buy or steal nuclear weapons and/or materials and/or to acquire the expertise to 
develop a nuclear capability. This thesis explores four competing perspectives in the 
United States on the accomplishments of the CTR's nuclear agenda. The key points of 
discord among the competing schools of thought include the significance of limitations 
on the ability of the United States to effectively monitor and accurately assess the 
contributions of the program, and the expansion of the program to include projects that 
do not directly concern weapons dismantlement. This thesis concludes that the CTR's 
contributions to countering WMD proliferation could be more effectively pursued if the 
United States enhanced the quality of the CTR and worked cooperatively with Russia to 
address the full spectrum of common interests. The thesis also finds that if Russia fails to 
develop an enduring safeguard culture much of the CTR assistance may prove to have 
been of no avail. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
When the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended, new risks associated 
with Russia emerged. The Soviet Union's collapse fragmented the strict control once 
exercised over the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Russia's internal problems, 
including political, economic, military and social instability, have created the risk that 
rogue'states or terrorists may attempt to exploit the uneertainties• in Russia to buy or steal' 
nuclear weapons and/or materials and/or to acquire the expertise to develop a nuclear 
capability. 
One of the major U.S. initiatives for combating WMD proliferation risks has been 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The CTR program is intended to 
enable the United States to work jointly with the republics of the former Soviet Union to 
help them reduce, eliminate, and/or safeguard their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and related infrastructures. Among other purposes, the CTR program aims to prevent any 
trafficking in "loose nukes" and to inhibit the "brain drain" -that is, the immigration of 
former Soviet weapons experts to WMD proliferant states. 
This thesis offers an analytical survey of evaluations of the effectiveness of the 
U.S.-sponsored CTR program. While the CTR program has been formally extended to 
all forms of WMD proliferation, nuclear activities present the greatest amount of 
controversy and the most significant cooperative challenges. This thesis is therefore 
dedicated to examining evaluations of the accomplishments of the CTR' s nuclear agenda. 
To date, the U.S. government has allocated over $4 billion dollars for CTR-
sponsored projects, and the 1999 protocol, which extends the program through June 
2006, has continued an upward trend in spending. As with many controversial and costly 
ix 
programs, skeptics question the value of the CTR program. The majority of U.S. 
literature on the CTR reflects four competing perspectives which together encompass the 
full spectrum of published analytical assessments. 
At one extreme is the school of Unconditional Supporters who fully endorse the 
CTR program. Proponents of this school maintain that the CTR program actively 
prevents proliferation by reducing the WMD arsenals in the former Soviet republics and 
by providing greater security for fissile materials and other WMD-related assets. At the 
other extreme are Complete Adversaries who denounce the CTR program as a threat to 
U.S. national security. Complete Adversaries argue that U.S. defense dollars are 
supporting the dismantlement of obsolete Russian weapons, thereby saving Russia money 
and subsidizing Russia's military activities, including strategic nuclear modernization 
programs. 
Between the extreme viewpoints lie two additional schools of thought - Program 
Advocates and Strong Critics -which present more temperate positions. While Program 
Advocates are strongly committed to the success of the CTR program, they acknowledge 
its shortfalls and the obstacles (primarily bureaucratic resistance and political 
vulnerability in both the United States and recipient countries) that the CTR program 
must work around and within. On the opposite side of the spectrum are Strong Critics 
who are concerned about the commitment of CTR resources to areas beyond WMD 
proliferation. In their view, the CTR program is being used as a "catch-all" to address 
problems that are clearly beyond the realm of the congressional mandate. 
Several aspects of the CTR program remain consistent points of contention 
among the four schools of thought. This thesis explores four key points of discord 
X 
associated with the CTR program: the transfer of strategic nuclear weapons from the non-
Russian nuclear successor states to Russia; the lack of transparency in Russia's fissile 
material operations and warhead dismantlement programs; the distribution of CTR 
responsibilities among U.S. federal agencies; and the expansion of CTR programs 
beyond the realm ofWMD dismantlement, safety, and security. 
The CTR program remains a principal source of U.S.-Russian interactions 
regarding WMD proliferation and associated safety and security matters. Evidence 
suggests, however, that neither country has provided enough funding and sustained 
political attention to make these efforts fully successful. This thesis concludes that the 
CTR program's contributions to countering WMD proliferation could be more effectively 
pursued if the United States enhanced the quality of the CTR and worked cooperatively 
with Russia and the other nuclear successor states of the former USSR to address the full 
spectrum of common interests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is an American initiative to 
work jointly with the republics of the former Soviet Union to help them reduce, 
eliminate, and/or safeguard their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related 
infrastructures. Among other purposes, CTR aims to stem the proliferation of "loose 
nukes" and to inhibit. the "brain drain" - that is, the immigration of former Soviet 
weapons experts to WMD proliferant states. Initial CTR nonproliferation efforts in the 
early 1990s focused exclusively on the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. By the mid-1990s, 
CTR nonproliferation programs gradually expanded to include chemical and biological 
weapons as well. While all forms of WMD present significant proliferation dangers, the 
nuclear programs remain the principal focus of the United States. 
The nuclear nonproliferation initiative began in 1991 as the Soviet Threat 
Reduction Act. When the program was first initiated, the United States envisioned a 
program with the Soviet Union based on cooperation and extensive transparency. The 
United States wanted to begin with an inventory of the Soviet nuclear warhead arsenal. 
Once tagged, the warheads were to be monitored through completion of the 
dismantlement process. There were even hopes of international oversight of the fissile 
material once in storage. The Soviets, however, made it clear that they did not want, nor 
did they need, assistance in dismantling nuclear warheads and that foreign governments 
would not be permitted oversight of this process. 1 Working within the boundaries set by 
1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former 
Soviet Union, Letter Report, 10 June 1994. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. 
the Soviet authorities, the United States agreed to help the Soviet Union dismantle 
nuclear delivery systems such as missiles, bombers, strategic submarines and missile 
silos. 
When the Soviet Union broke apart in December 1991, the U.S. initiative was 
restructured as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The efforts initially focused 
on the four nuclear successor states - Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus - which 
inherited the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal and its extensive infrastructure. The first 
priority of the United States was to consolidate the strategic warheads under the 
command and control of one authority - Russia. Once the warheads were transferred to 
Russia, efforts to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, technology and 
expertise to third parties were added to the program. Under the CTR program, instead of 
providing cash to fund the weapons reduction process, the United States provides 
equipment, technical assistance, support and training. In most cases, U.S. nuclear experts 
who work with former Soviet scientists and engineers to safeguard and dismantle 
Russia's nuclear arsenal use equipment built in the United States. 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the executive agency for the CTR 
program. By the mid-1990s, activities under the CTR umbrella were extended to other 
agencies, including the U.S. Departments of Energy (DoE) and State (DoS). The 
contributions of each department are specifically focused to maximize the benefits of its 
expertise. The DoD is primarily involved in expediting the elimination of strategic 
offensive systems pursuant to the START treaties. Efforts by the DoE are primarily 
focused on upgrading the security at nuclear weapons and fissile material storage sites as 
2 
well as redirecting the talents of former weapons experts to peaceful ventures with 
commercial applications. The Department of State is also a key player in curbing 
transnational proliferation, a principal concern of both the United States and the former 
Soviet republics. The DoS works to strengthen export controls and to improve the ability 
of border control officials to intercept the illegal transport of nuclear materials and 
nuclear-related technology. 
In 1999, Congress voted to extend the CTR program through the year 2006. The 
extension, referred to as the CTR Umbrella Agreement, is evidence of the sustained 
commitment within both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government to 
the CTR' s nuclear security agenda. This phase of the nonproliferation effort is formally 
known as the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). Introduced in fiscal year 
2000, the initiative represents a collection of programs led by the U.S. Defense, Energy 
and State Departments that provide nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet 
republics. The introduction of ETRI marks the beginning of the CTR program's 
sustainment phase. Unlike the early development phase, in which new projects were 
initiated, during the sustainment phase resources are reserved for existing projects. 
While an extension of the CTR for seven years is highly significant and reflects a 
strong U.S. commitment to nonproliferation, the ETRI also includes more restrictions and 
funding limitations than earlier CTR efforts. United States support is limited to projects 
which directly support core congressional priorities. The 2000 National Defense 
Authorization Bill, for example, meets and in many cases exceeds the President's budget 
3 
requests for nuclear weapons-related projects. Projects that do not receive near-
equivalent funding from the host republics or that lack clear and tangible benefits to U.S. 
national security usually fold when U.S. support is terminated. Members of Congress 
considered the costs of the chemical weapons destruction facility, for example, exorbitant 
and out of proportion with the prospective benefits. This project was consequently 
terminated in the 2000 National Defense Authorization Bill.2 In addition, the 2000 
National Defense Authorization Bill permanently restricts the use of funds for non-
defense-related activities such as peacekeeping, housing for retired Russian Strategic 
Rocket Force officers, environmental restoration, and defense conversion. 
The ETRI and the restrictions introduced in the 2000 National Defense 
Authorization Bill are likely to influence future U.S. support for nonproliferation 
programs in the former Soviet Union. The United States now has nearly ten years of 
threat reduction experience. Over the years, the CTR program has become more efficient 
and its funding more streamlined, yet opposition to the program and reservations about 
Russian intentions and prospects are still prominent and threaten U.S. congressional 
support. 
2 Congress, House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Title XIII Cooperative Threat 
Reduction With States of the Former Soviet Union found in FY 2000, National Defense Authorization Bill, 
Report No. 106- I 62, 1061h Congress, I 51 Session, 24 May I 999. Also see U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less than 
Planned, 13 April I999. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. 
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A. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
This thesis offers an analytical survey of evaluations of the effectiveness of the 
U.S.-sponsored nonproliferation effort known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program. While the program has been formally extended to all forms of WMD 
proliferation, the main focus of the United States efforts, along with the majority of 
funds, has been the nuclear aspects. In addition to consuming the majority of resources, 
the nuclear programs also present the greatest amount of controversy and the most 
significant cooperative challenges. This thesis is therefore dedicated to examining 
evaluations of the accomplishments of the CTR's nuclear agenda. While this thesis 
reviews assessments of the effectiveness of the CTR program, it is not intended to present 
an exhaustive critique of each project sponsored under this program. 
Evaluations of the CTR frequently raise the following questions: 
• Is the CTR program effectively curbing the threats of "loose nukes" and 
"brain drain" created as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
the subsequent economic crisis? 
• What factors account for the primary changes in CTR policy over the life of 
the program? How have the changes affected the program? 
• What accounts for the survival of the CTR program despite the extensive 
criticism? What factors explain the concrete gains achieved by some projects, 
while others have folded? 
5 
• Should U.S.-mandated requirements, such as increased transparency and a 
balanced funding formula, be necessary stipulations for continued U.S. 
support of the CTR program? 
• Have NATO policies such as the enlargement of the Alliance and the bombing 
in Yugoslavia affected efforts to stem WMD proliferation in the former Soviet 
republics? 
When the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended, new risks associated 
with Russia emerged. Indeed, many experts argue that today's risks are even greater than 
those during the Cold War. In contrast with the Cold War situation, the risks associated 
with Russia today stem from its weakness and not its strength. The Soviet Union's 
collapse fragmented the strict control once exercised over the Soviet nuclear arsenal. 
Moreover, Russia's internal problems, including the country's political, economic, 
military and social instability, have created the risk that rogue states or terrorists will 
exploit the uncertainties in Russia to buy or steal nuclear weapons and/or materials and/or 
to acquire the expertise to develop a nuclear capability. 
B. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program plays a pivotal, though highly 
controversial, role in the U.S. government's efforts to cope with the expanded challenges 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that have emerged in the post-Soviet period. 
The United States has a significant stake in this problem because of the danger that 
nuclear weapons, materials, technology or expertise could be obtained by terrorist groups 
or rogue states. Based on congressional direction, the CTR program supports core U.S. 
6 
national security priorities by implementing strategies to combat the spread of nuclear 
weapons and supporting infrastructures. The CTR program provides assistance to the 
newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union to dismantle and destroy 
nuclear weapons, to strengthen the security at nuclear weapons and fissile material 
storage sites, to prevent proliferation, and to help demilitarize the industrial and scientific 
infrastructure which supports the former Soviet nuclear posture. 
To date, the U.S. administration has allocated over $4 billion dollars for CTR-
sponsored projects, and the 1999 protocol, which extends the program through June 
2006, has continued an upward trend in spending. As with many controversial and costly 
programs, skeptics question the value of the CTR program. U.S. critics of the CTR 
program have stated that Russia's nuclear security practices, military goals, and inability 
to fund its share of cooperative projects undermine the prospects for success of the CTR's 
proliferation prevention efforts. This thesis explores the U.S. discussion about the CTR 
program and its effect on curbing the threat of weapons proliferations. Most Americans 
agree that the United States must actively address the weapons proliferation threat before 
it is beyond control. Assessing the full spectrum of criticism and support for the CTR 
program may help to provide a foundation for decisions to eliminate costly and 
ineffective projects while improving those which demonstrate concrete gains. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is based on U.S.literature about the CTR. The sources encompass 
journalistic and scholarly discussions as well as various types of government documents, 
including congressional hearings and reports. Publications by advocates and critics are 
7 
relatively abundant and cover issues affecting the full scope of the CTR program's 
history. 
While the most controversial and heavily debated issue for both advocates and 
critics of the CTR program concerns its ability to curtail the proliferation of WMD from 
the former Soviet Union, little official government material appears in open sources that 
can conclusively demonstrate this result. Testimony by the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities in March 2000 disclosed concerns about the government's inability to prove 
that the CTR program has achieved its intended purpose. Officials from the GAO noted 
that they have "relative confidence" that the DoD played a tangible role in helping the 
former Soviet republics comply with their arms control treaty obligations. However, 
GAO officials added, "conclusively demonstrating that most of these programs have a 
positive impact [on U.S. national security] has proven to be very difficult." 3 
The GAO testimony characterized the CTR program as an "inherent cost risk" 
because of the difficulty of demonstrating any positive impact. The GAO assigned 
primary blame for the lack of conclusive evidence to Russia's reluctance to provide the 
United States with access to sensitive nuclear materials and facilities. According to GAO 
officials, Russia's concern about divulging state secrets has denied the DoD the ability to 
monitor the implementation of the programs and to confirm that U.S. assistance is being 
used as intended.4 
3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats From the 
Former Soviet Union, 6 March 2000. GAO/ T-NSIAD/RCED- 00-119. 
4 Ibid. 
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Adding to the complexity of the situation, most of the verification problems 
involve nuclear-related projects which consume the majority of CTR funds. These 
projects include nuclear warhead elimination, fissile material storage, security system 
upgrades of laboratories and weapons storage sites, and programs to supplement the 
salaries of former Soviet weapons scientists. The result has been a high degree of 
skepticism, even among some CTR supporters. The skepticism has continued to mount 
as more funds have been consumed without mechanisms to verify the program's specific 
applications and effects. 
This thesis attempts to identify the roadblocks discussed in the U.S open-source 
literature on the CTR program. These roadblocks have evidently prevented 
comprehensive assessments of the CTR program's contributions. While Russia's secrecy 
surrounding its nuclear program is a primary obstacle, some assessments of the program 
indicate that Russia is not solely responsible for the roadblocks. 
This thesis begins its evaluation by exploring four schools of thought on the CTR 
program. The majority of U.S. literature on the CTR reflects the perspectives of these 
four competing perspectives, which together encompass the full spectrum of published 
analytical assessments. Each of the four schools of thought appraises the CTR program 
on a scale that pivots on the fulcrum of U.S. national security. Their arguments, 
however, differ substantially. At one extreme is the school of thought which 
unconditionally supports all CTR activities. Proponents of this school maintain that .the 
CTR program is one of the most effective and efficient tools by which the U.S. 
government can ensure a more stable international security environment. Supporters of 
9 
this school of thought maintain that the CTR program actively prevents proliferation by 
reducing the WMD arsenals in the former Soviet republics and by providing greater 
security for fissile materials and other WMD-related assets. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the school of thought that consistently 
criticizes the majority of CTR projects and that holds that the CTR program actually 
endangers America's national security. These critics object to the concept of a U.S.-
funded project which provides assistance to Russia. These critics argue that U.S. defense 
dollars are supporting the dismantlement of obsolete Russian weapons, thereby saving 
Russia money and subsidizing Russia's military activities, including strategic nuclear 
modernization programs. 
The majority of analytical interpretation falls between the two extremes. Both 
sides of the fulcrum - that is, the two schools of thought in the middle of the spectrum -
,recognize the magnitude of the potential WMD proliferation dangers created by the 
demise of the Soviet Union, but contend that CTR programs have grown beyond their 
intended boundaries - for example, in constructing housing for retired Russian Strategic 
Rocket Force officers. 
After examining the four schools of thought and their general perspectives on the 
CTR program, this thesis explores several key points of discord that repeatedly surface in 
the debate among the four schools of thought. The disagreements generally concern the 
significance of the limitations on the ability of the United States to effectively monitor 
and accurately assess the contributions of the CTR program. One primary area of 
contention, for example, is the transfer of nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Belarus and 
10 
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Kazakhstan to Russia, where American inspectors have no independent means to verify 
their destruction. This transfer involved multiple factors, including agreements between 
the United States and each of the four nuclear successor states. This thesis also addresses 
factors that have contributed to disagreements on other issues affecting the CTR program, 
such as the extensive delay in ratification of START II by the Russian government (from 
January 1993 to May 2000). Russia's recent decision to increase exports of nuclear 
technologies to states not subject to the constraints of international monitoring, such as 
India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Cuba or Yugoslavia, constitutes another 
concern.5 In view of these factors and others, the final topic examined in this thesis 
concerns the CTR program's prospects for the future. 
D. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
The very nature of this thesis topic implies research limitations. Containment of 
nuclear proliferation is difficult to measure. In November 1996, Secretary of Defense 
William Perry referred to this challenge when he called the CTR program "Defense by 
other means .. .its greatest value is not in what happens but in what does not happen."6 
Verification of results has traditionally been the prescribed means of building and 
maintaining confidence in a program. It is, however, much more difficult to demonstrate 
results for a program whose success is inferred if something does not happen. Short of an 
obvious breach in nonproliferation treaty agreements, such as the launch or detonation of 
a weapon, the success or failure of a nonproliferation program is difficult to demonstrate. 
5 Jamestown Foundation, "Russia Goes It Alone to Expand Sales on Nuclear Technologies," The Monitor-
A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 6, No. 108, 2 June 2000. 
6 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry addresses the Society of American Engineers, Washington D.C., 20 
November 1996. 
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The implementation of the CTR program has therefore presented evaluation 
difficulties. As Dunbar Lockwood pointed out in 1995, the only quantifiable means of 
measuring success was to count the number of agreements signed; their funding levels; 
and the amount of equipment, services, and training delivered.7 
The challenge of measuring success or failure is compounded by that of 
determining the specific goals and priorities of the CTR program. Vague verbiage in the 
congressional legislation provides the flexibility needed to conduct a program of this 
character and magnitude; at the same time, however, this flexibility severely limits the 
ability of officials to identify specific and concrete objectives. The inherent flexibility of 
the congressional mandate has left executive organizations with the responsibility of 
clarifying goals and translating them into program objectives. The mandate, however, 
has also given the DoD enough flexibility to develop and fund CTR projects in a manner 
which is directly aligned with the DoD's overarching priorities. For example, the 
congressional legislation which authorizes the CTR program makes no specific mention 
of ensuring that the former Soviet republics meet the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START) treaty obligations. However, the DoD, as the executive agency for CTR, has 
made compliance with START requirements "the chief aim and ultimate 'yardstick' of 
the program's success."8 
Clearly, Russia's compliance with START requirements directly supports U.S. 
national security objectives. A key issue in the U.S. debate about CTR, however, 
7 Dunbar Lockwood, "Getting Down to Business," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 5 I, No. I, January 
1995,p. 12. 
8 Jason Ellis, "Nunn-Lugar's Mid-Life Crisis," Survival, Vol. 39, No. I, Spring 1997, p. 88. 
12 
concerns the priority attached to meeting START requirements, which consume the 
majority of CTR funds- despite Russia's insistence that U.S. CTR aid serves only to 
accelerate Russia's implementation of its START reduction levels. 9 
Evaluation challenges are further complicated by the issue of "secondary 
benefits" or "broad implications" of the CTR program. Should these "secondary 
benefits" be considered in an evaluation, and if so, to what extent? The broader 
implications of the CTR program appear to be its contributions to strengthening 
democracy and helping the NIS make the transition to market economies. Even CTR 
efforts that are highly controversial, such as demilitarization and defense conversion, may 
provide contributions in this category. One of the principal benefits often cited by CTR 
advocates is that the program helps the United States build strong political and economic 
ties with Russia and the other former Soviet republics. Measuring the significance of the 
CTR in the achievement of such "secondary benefits" is obviously difficult and 
potentially subjective. 
Attempts to make an accurate assessment of the CTR program are further 
restrained by Russia's secrecy surrounding its nuclear projects. Russia's propensity to 
rely on secrecy is not only an element of military security but also an enduring remnant 
of the Soviet culture and pre-Soviet Tsarist traditions. Even before the agreements 
were finalized in the early 1991 Soviet Threat Reduction Initiative, it was apparent that 
the scope of U.S. assistance would be limited by the high level of secrecy used by the 
9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threats from the Former 
Soviet Union, Letter Report, 6 October 1994. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. 
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Soviet Union to conceal and protect its nuclear activities. Russia's insistence that 
warheads from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus be consolidated in Russia and under its 
complete control was an initial indication that roadblocks on U.S. assistance would be 
created as a result of Russia's shroud of nuclear secrecy. 
Owing mainly to the limitations created by Russia's culture of secrecy, the 
problem of inadequate transparency continues to significantly threaten U.S. congressional 
willingness to sustain the CTR program. Senator Richard Lugar, one of the founders of 
the CTR ·initiative, has emphasized the importance of transparency and has noted that 
requirements for U.S. involvement in warhead dismantlement in Russia will continue to 
escalate. He has indicated that there will be an increased demand for bilateral 
accountability and verification measures as the nuclear arsenals of both the United States 
and Russia are reduced. "Earlier in the process a small margin of error could be tolerated 
because both sides still maintained thousands of weapons. As we continue to reduce the 
arsenals, the importance of precise verification of warhead dismantlement will become 
increasing! y important." 10 
E. CHAPfER OUTLINE 
Chapter II presents four schools of thought identified through an analytical survey 
of the U.S. literature on the CTR program. The four schools offer competing 
interpretations of the program and its effectiveness. Chapter III addresses several 
10 Senator Richard G. Lugar addresses the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Conference at the 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 11-13 December 1999, 
commentary on "Nunn-Lugar: The Past as a Guide to the Future," in "Assessing U.S. Dismantlement and 
Nonproliferation Assistance Programs in the Newly Independent States," CNS Program: NISNP 
Conference. Available Online: http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projectslnisnp/ctrconf/spech03.htm 
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key issues that have surfaced repeatedly in the debate among the four schools of thought. 
An analysis of these key issues may yield insights about the accomplishments and 
problems of the CTR program as well as about major changes over the life of the CTR 
program. Chapter IV presents conclusions. It explores the prospects of the CTR program 
and future challenges to its survival. 
15 
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II. FOUR SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: INTERPRETING THE 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has generated controversy among 
U.S. government officials and political analysts as well as among scholars and 
journalists. Their debate incorporates a wide range of perspectives and interpretations of 
the CTR program. Although the perspectives - here referred to as schools of thought -
are diverse and often competing, improvements in the CTR program are likely to be 
rooted in some degree of skepticism or uncertainty. In this respect, both advocates and 
critics may provide means to enhance the effectiveness of the CTR program. 
This chapter surveys interpretive analyses and assessments of the CTR program. 
Four distinct perspectives have been repeatedly expressed in various open sources, 
including scholarly journals, newspaper editorials, government reports, and congressional 
hearings. While these perspectives are not specifically labeled in the literature, they are 
categorized in this thesis to facilitate identification and assessment. The four schools of 
thought express degrees of criticism or support for the CTR. Their arguments generally 
emphasize particular facets of the program. 
Two schools of thought are built upon uncompromising principles and rigid 
philosophies. They stand at extreme opposite ends in the span of CTR interpretations. 
The two extreme perspectives offer a contrast between those who give the CTR a blanket 
endorsement and those who dismiss the program outright. At one extreme is the school 
of Unconditional Supporters who fully endorse the CTR program, referring to it as 
"defense by other means," and "a window of opportunity." At the other extreme are 
17 
Complete Adversaries who denounce the CTR program as a threat to U.S. national 
security. Unwilling to dismiss Cold War suspicions, these critics of the CTR program 
liken Russia's level of bilateral cooperation to that of Iraq and North Korea, especially in 
terms of transparency and verification. 11 
Between the extreme viewpoints lie two additional schools of thought which 
present more temperate positions. While these two schools theoretically oppose one 
another, both support CTR-sponsored projects which focus directly on denuclearization 
efforts. In general, these two schools are more likely to look beyond preconceived 
notions about the CTR program. Unlike the extreme perspectives, they typically provide 
constructive criticisms and recommendations for improvement instead of endorsing or 
denouncing the program outright. In this thesis these schools in the middle of the 
spectrum are called Program Advocates and Strong Critics. Program Advocates strive to 
eliminate problems while preserving the programs that directly promote denuclearization. 
Strong Critics acknowledge the need for nonproliferation programs and agree with the 
"spirit" of the CTR program. They contend, however, that the program has veered far off 
course and requires a major overhaul. According to these critics, the CTR program has 
been plagued with "mission creep" and "slippery slopes" which have expanded the scope 
of the CTR initiative to the extent that projects no longer support the program's core 
objectives. 
11 Richard F. Staar, "A Russian Rearmament Wish List," ORBIS, Vol. 43, No.4, Fall 1999. 
18 
A. UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS- A BLANKET ENDORSEMENT 
Some Unconditional Supporters have endorsed the CTR program without 
reservations since its inception. Senators Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) and Richard 
Lugar (Republican-Indiana), the bipartisan founders of the program, introduced the CTR 
program as a vehicle for the United States to respond to "the number one national 
security challenge"- "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."12 Many experts 
contend that Russia's social and political chaos and weakened economy have created an 
environment in which nuclear weapons may pose a greater threat to the United States 
than they did during the Cold War. According to Senator Nunn, "We have moved from 
an era of high risk, but also high stability, to an era of much lower risk, but also much 
less stability." 13 For more than 50 years, it is argued, the superpowers- the United States 
and the Soviet Union- shared an understanding of the devastating consequences of 
nuclear war. This shared consensus reduced the probability of a nuclear exchange. 
Today, the situation is very different. The Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, with fifteen 
successor states. The Soviet breakup weakened the stability of the former Soviet nuclear 
control regime, thereby creating a potentially dangerous proliferation environment. 
According to Senator Lugar, the present nuclear threat is a result of the collapse of the 
Soviet regime and the subsequent decay of the nuclear custodial system, which together 
12 Sam Nunn, "Foreword," to John Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. 
and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1997) p. xx. 
13 Sam Nunn addresses the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearings on Global 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials, 
13 March 1996, The Nuclear Roundtable, Background Document. 
Available Online: http://www .stimson.org/rd-table/3nunn.htm 
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have eliminated the "proliferation choke-point." 14 
Seeking a means to restore the proliferation chokepoint, the Clinton 
administration established a strong team of CTR program advocates. Les Aspin, 
President Clinton's first Secretary of Defense, helped to lay the foundation for threat 
reduction programs with the Soviet Union; and his successor, William Perry, fully 
supported the CTR program as a means of "preventive defense." Perry considered 
preventive defense, which relies on economic and technical resources instead of 
traditional military force, the future direction of U.S. security strategy. 15 Other members 
of the Clinton administration's CTR team have included Ashton Carter, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in 1993-1996, who as a Harvard 
professor provided the conceptual framework for the CTR program; and Gloria Duffy, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Special Coordinator for the CTR program in 
1993-1995, who played the lead role in negotiating threat reduction agreements. 
President Clinton's administration has remained loyal to the school of 
Unconditional Supporters. The President's 1999 State of the Union Address emphasized 
the importance of proliferation prevention initiatives. "We must expand our work with 
Russia, Ukraine, and the other former Soviet nations to safeguard nuclear materials and 
14 Senator Richard G. Lugar addresses the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Conference at the 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 11-13 December 1999, 
"Nunn-Lugar: The Past as a Guide to the Future," in "Assessing U.S. Dismantlement and Nonproliferation 
Assistance Programs in the Newly Independent States," CNS Project: NISNP Conference. Available 
Online: http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/nisnp/ctrconf/spch03.htm 
15 William Perry, "Managing Danger: Prevent, Deter, Defeat," Introduction to the "Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress," Defense Viewpoint, Vol. II, No. 13,4 March 1996. Available Online: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/di 1113.html 
Also see John Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives 
on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), p.25. 
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technology so they never fall into the wrong hands."16 The school of Unconditional 
Supporters unequivocally endorsed the President's statement and his FY 2000 budget 
proposal, which provided an additional $4.2 billion for the CTR program over a five-
year period, as testimony to the CTR program's value and its contributions to U.S. 
national security. President Clinton's $895 million CTR budget request for FY 2001 
boosts the resources for existing nonproliferation efforts with nearly a ten percent 
increase over the previous year. 17 
The school of Unconditional Supporters is comprised of key U.S. civilian and 
military officials who fully endorse the program as one of the most effective and 
economical means of protecting the security interests of the United States and its allies. 
They describe the CTR program as a unique opportunity to work cooperatively with 
former adversaries toward a common security goal. While the Unconditional Supporters 
provide the most stalwart and consistent support for the program, their blanket 
endorsement fails to persuade some observers for various reasons. To begin with, 
government officials obviously have little latitude to criticize a program they are 
responsible for implementing, or to discuss its limitations. 
Moreover, from the perspective of observers in other schools of thought, 
Unconditional Supporters typically overstate the CTR's contributions to nonproliferation. 
While champions of the other schools of thought also emphasize 
16 Clinton quoted in Edward Goldstein, "Avoiding Armageddon," Government Executive, Vol. 31, 
No.6, June 1999, p. 39. 
17 William Hoehn, "The Clinton Administration's Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Requests for Nuclear Security 
Cooperation With Russia," 13 March 2000. Available Online: 
http://www.rinceton.edu/-rnasac/congress/FY01-budget.html 
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particular aspects of the program, the Unconditional Supporters have been criticized for 
presenting misleading or distorted information. For example, one common 
misperception, influenced by official descriptions of the program, is that the CTR 
initiative is fully responsible for the decisions by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to 
abandon their nuclear weapons capabilities. While the CTR program undoubtedly 
provided a strong financial incentive to denuclearize, CTR was only one element in the 
long process of delicate diplomacy pursued by U.S., British, and Russian officials, among 
others. 
Another common misperception is that the CTR program is fully responsible for 
Russia's ability to comply with START I and II requirements. This assessment is 
overstated and misleading. In the non-Russian republics, START compliance can be 
largely attributed to the CTR program. However, in Russia, the CTR program has 
probably at best only accelerated the pace at which strategic nuclear delivery systems 
have been dismantled. 
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), Department of Defense 
officials made comments during a 1995 GAO review which misrepresented and 
exaggerated the contributions of the CTR program. DoD officials presented misleading 
information, the GAO concluded, in that they attributed sole credit to the CTR program 
for progress in weapons elimination. Statements by DoD officials implied that every 
nuclear missile and warhead deactivated since the collapse of the Soviet Union could be 
22 
attributed to the CTR program. 18 One DoD official indicated that "Missiles containing 
2,825 warheads have been deactivated since the Soviet collapse" in 1991, but did not 
indicate how many of these were deactivated through the direct use of CTR assistance, 
which first began arriving in mid-1993. 19 According to another DoD statement, 
"Approximately 630 strategic launchers and bombers have been eliminated since the 
Soviet collapse." By 1994, however, Russia had eliminated more than 400 strategic 
launchers and bombers before receiving any CTR assistance for delivery vehicle 
elimination.20 The GAO investigation concluded that the DoD was unable to determine 
the specific impact of CTR assistance - that is, in terms of the number of delivery 
systems and warheads dismantled with CTR support.21 
B. PROGRAM ADVOCATES 
The second school of thought consists of the Program Advocates. While 
members of this camp are strongly committed to the success of the CTR program, they 
also acknowledge its shortfalls and the obstacles (primarily bureaucratic resistance and 
political vulnerability in both the United States and recipient countries) that the program 
must work around and within. Program Advocates readily admit that the CTR program 
cannot eliminate the threat entirely and that, like all programs, it has limitations. Even 
on a conceptual basis, the CTR program entails constraints. While the program is based 
18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former 





on cooperative efforts, U.S. activities are limited by constraints defined by the Russian 
government. 
The basic philosophy of Program Advocates can be summed up as follows: 
"Achieving success in this arena may be difficult, but failing to act may carry even 
greater risks."22 Program Advocates acknowledge that a program of this nature and 
magnitude will undergo substantial changes, especially during its infant years. They are 
also aware of the damage, in terms of congressional support, which effective and cogent 
criticism can cause. This school therefore seeks to identify and eliminate the problems 
without terminating useful CTR programs. 
Their first effort to sustain the program came with less than two years of CTR 
experience. The initial phase of the CTR program involved developing agreements 
between the United States and the former Soviet republics. The process was slow and 
CTR assistance showed few signs of reducing the proliferation threat. In late 1994, 
skeptics began to question the benefits of the program and particularly the 
appropriateness of using the U.S. defense budget for a program of this nature. In an 
effort to preserve the program and regain congressional support, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense John Deutch restructured the program and made the U.S. Departments of Energy 
and State executive agents for non-weapons and non-dismantlement programs. 
Program Advocates acknowledge that the program's funding is not inexhaustible 
and that many U.S. initiatives, such as those which employ former Soviet scientists and 
22 David Mosher and Geoffrey Forden, "Cooperative Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and 
Improve the Openness of Nuclear Disarmament," U.S. Congressional Budget Office, National Security 
Division, May 1999. Available Online: http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm 
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weapons designers, are only intended to "jump-start" the denuclearization process in 
Russia and the other nuclear successor states. They support the employment of former 
Soviet scientists in peaceful nonmilitary projects, but recognize that the CTR program 
must begin a transition process with recipient countries that enables these scientists to be 
weaned from dependence on CTR assistance without regenerating unemployment and 
thereby increasing the threat that WMD expertise will proliferate to terrorists and rogue 
states?3 
Program Advocates point out that as the CTR program matures it will face many 
new challenges and uncertainties. They recommend that each CTR effort be judged on 
its individual merits instead of eliminating the entire CTR program because of specific 
deficiencies. For example, a 1999 GAO report reviewed the Initiative for Proliferation 
Prevention (IPP) program, a CTR initiative designed to reduce the risks posed by 
Russia's unemployed weapons scientists. The GAO report indicated that some scientists 
currently receiving CTR assistance were still working in Russia's WMD program.24 It 
also indicated that U.S. officials did not know how many scientists were receiving CTR 
program funds and that they were not certain that CTR assistance was being provided to 
the appropriate individuals or institutions.25 Senator Joseph Biden responded to these 
findings as follows: "It may well be that some projects involve aid recipients who are not 
23 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks 
Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, Report to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign 




really the 'at risk' experts whom the IPP intends to assist."26 In contrast, one might 
consider the reply of an Unconditional Supporter. Ashton B. Carter, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Policy, responded to findings about the CTR 
program's mismanagement of funds as follows: "While isolated instances of diversion or 
misuse may arise in a program of this size and scope, we [U.S. DoD] are confident to 
date that CTR assistance is serving the purpose we intended.'m 
Despite the program's shortfalls, Program Advocates consider it a strong source 
of political leverage for the United States. Kenneth Luongo, a former senior advisor to 
the Secretary of Energy for Non-Proliferation Policy and a strong advocate of the 
program, suggests that CTR leverage can be used to provide mutual benefits for the 
United States and recipient countries and improve the efficiency of the program. 
Luongo deems the United States agreement to purchase highly enriched uranium from 
Russia over a 20-year period an excellent opportunity. Luongo suggests that conditional 
requirements should dictate how some of the funds are spent. For example, a substantial 
portion of the income from U.S. purchases could be used to pay nuclear security guards 
and finance other security improvements. 28 Even on a more basic level, Matthew Bunn 
26 Joseph Biden, "Maintaining the Proliferation Fight in the Former Soviet Union," Arms Control Today, 
Vol. 29, No.2, March 1999, p. 20-25. 
27 Ashton B. Carter, quoted in "Response from the Department of Defense [response to Michael Waller's 
'To Russia, With Cash' article]," Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 5, 
No. I, Winter 1997, p. 144. 
28 Kenneth N. Luongo and Matthew Bunn, "Preempting a Russian Nuclear Meltdown," Global Beat Issue Brief, No. 
45, 5 December 1998. 
Available Online: http://www.nyu.edu.globalbeat/pubs/ib45.html 
26 
has suggested, conditional requirements could stipulate that funds be used to pay 
electrical bills so security systems installed by the CTR program can operate?9 
While Program Advocates emphasize the many benefits which the CTR program 
provides, they consider the majority of criticism unwarranted and dismiss it as resulting 
from an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of the program. For example, some 
critics have argued that the CTR program requires or at least strongly prefers to utilize 
U.S. firms in its contracting practices, and that this practice creates resentment among 
foreign counterparts and may result in a higher cost for CTR equipment and materials. 30 
Program Advocates, however, contend that this criticism is misplaced and a result of 
erroneous information or a misinterpretation of CTR policies. According to Program 
Advocates, CTR contracting practices strictly follow U.S. federal procurement laws 
which forbid preferential treatment and allow any country, American or foreign, to bid on 
a CTR contract.31 
Program Advocates also suggest that criticism is often linked to residual Cold 
War attitudes. Representative Ellen Tauscher (Democrat-California) has asserted that 
some Members of Congress are reluctant to abandon their reservations about working 
with the Russians. "Some of my colleagues don't like the idea that the Cold War is over. 
They were very comfortable with the idea that we [Americans] hated the Russians."32 
29 Matthew Bunn, "Loose Nukes Fears: Anecdotes of the Current Crisis" Global Beat, No. 45, 5 December 1998. 
Available Online: http://www.nyu.edu.globalbeat/pubs/ib45 .html 
3° Charles Flickner, "The Russian Aid Mess," The National Interest, No. 38, Winter 1994/95, p. I7 
31 RichardS. Soli, "Misconceptions About the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program," Director's Series 
on Proliferation, No.8, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, I June I995, p.40 
32 Ellen Tauscher quoted in "The Nuclear Cities Initiative and Winning the Post-Cold War," Global Beat, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Program, Project Proliferation Brief, 
Vol..2, No. I6, 4 October 1999. Available Online: 
http:/ /wwwnnyu.edu/ globalbeat/nuclear/CEIP I 00499 .html 
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She has also implied that without a clearly threatening enemy, there is little congressional 
incentive to finance a strong defense: "How do you build up a strong defense if you don't 
have an enemy?"33 
C. STRONG CRITICS 
This school of thought falls on the opposite side of the fulcrum in its 
interpretation of the CTR program's contributions to U.S. national security. The Strong 
Critics consistently question the level of benefits that the United States gains from 
supporting the CTR program. Strong Critics of the CTR are skeptical about committing 
funds to any program that seems primarily to benefit Russia. Strong Critics are 
concerned about the commitment of CTR resources to areas beyond the initial WMD 
focus of the program. In their view, the CTR program is being used as a "catch-all" to 
address problems that are clearly beyond the realm of the congressional mandate, and the 
program's capacity to accomplish its basic goals has thereby been diminished. This 
school holds that the CTR program has failed because of attempts to expand the CTR's 
focus beyond the former Soviet WMD arsenal. For Strong Critics, "mission creep" and 
"slippery slopes" threaten to kill the CTR program.34 
Strong Critics oppose attempts to increase the flexibility of the CTR legislation 
and thereby allow programs to extend beyond the WMD realm. This issue has arisen in 
some cases because of genuine problems in the former Soviet Union. Senator Lugar has 
noted, for example, that the CTR program could benefit from gaining "the flexibility to 
33 Ibid. 
34 Jason Ellis, "Nunn-Lugar's Midlife Crisis," Survival, Spring 1997, p. 100. Also see John W.R. 
Lepingwell and Nikolai Sokov, "Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and Weapons Protection, Control 
and Accounting," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. I, Spring 2000, p. 70. 
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focus our [United States] efforts on the destruction of weapons that could threaten our 
vital interests regardless of their strategic or non-strategic classification."35 Lugar has 
cited, for example, the backlog of Russian "general purpose" nuclear-powered 
submarines whose dismantlement is not funded under the current CTR legislation.36 
In 1999 Russian officials estimated that in the year 2000, approximately 100 
nuclear-propelled, non-strategic submarines will be awaiting dismantlement.37 Russian 
officials requested that CTR assistance be expanded to this area; however, they caveated 
their request by emphasizing that the dismantlement of newer strategic ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs), which are eligible for funding by the CTR program, could not be 
authorized prior to that of attack submarines and other early-generation vessels, 
regardless of the CTR protocol. 38 CTR critics have called this caveated request "nuclear 
blackmail." According to CTR critics, Russia is using an extortion tactic, which plays on 
American fears of nuclear proliferation, to gain financial assistance for tasks that are not 
covered by CTR support. Tactics such as these, according to CTR critics, only serve to 
perpetuate Cold War suspicions and to discourage the United States and other nations 
from supporting CTR-like programs. 39 
35 Lugar, "Assessing U.S. Dismantlement and Nonproliferation Assistance Programs in the Newly 
Independent States, Commentary on Nunn-Lugar: The Past as a Guide to the Future," Newly Independent 
States Nonproliferation Conference, 13 December 1999, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 
Institute of International Studies. Available Online: 
http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/nisnp/ctrconf/spch03.htm 
36Ibid. · 
37 Igor Kudrik, "International Cooperation on Radiation Safety in the Russian Navy," The Nuclear 
Chronicle, Bellona, 28 February 1999. http://www.bellona.no 
38 Ibid. 
39Michael Mcfaul, "Getting Russia Right," Foreign Policy, Vol. 117, Winter 1999, p. 2. See Also Richard 
Kelly, "The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion," Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, Briefing 
No. 39, 18 March 1996. pp. 1-15. Available Online: http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-039.html 
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In addition to Russia's "caveated request" for the United States to finance the 
dismantlement of obsolete, non-strategic submarines, Moscow has made a number of 
other decisions which have also been perceived as containing an undertone of blackmail. 
Critics contend that Russia is playing a game of nuclear "blackmail" in which Moscow 
demands U.S. concessions in exchange for arms control agreements.40 An example 
involves the United States decision to help Russia finance the Mayak fissile material 
storage facility. According to published reports, the United States agreed to jointly fund 
the Mayak facility with the understanding that all fissile materials extracted from 
warheads would be consolidated at this facility. 41 This agreement initially appeared to 
establish optimal conditions for U.S. efforts to monitor and account for fissile materials 
in Russia. 
However, Viktor Mikhailov, the head of the Russian Federation's Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MINATOM), indicated that Russia intended to maintain multiple storage 
sites and that the United States would only have access to the facilities which it funded. 
"Plutonium from dismantled warheads might be stored at several different places and the 
United States would only have access to the sites for which it pays ... the United States 
will have to increase its assistance to Russia if it wants access to all of them."42 While it 
is unclear whether these comments actually reflect Russian policy, the statement implies 
that Russia is using its nuclear assets as leverage to obtain additional CTR funds from the 
40 Michael Mcfaul, "Getting Russia Right," Foreign Policy, Vol. 117, Winter 1999, p. 2. Also see Kelley, 
"The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion," p. 7. 
41 
"Former Soviet Republics Clear Way for Nunn-Lugar Monies," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. I, 
January 1994, pp. 28-29. 
42 Viktor Mikhailov quoted in "Former Soviet Republics Clear Way for Nunn-Lugar Monies," Arms 
Control Today, Vol. 24, No.1, January 1994, pp. 28-29. 
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United States. A 1999 GAO report confirmed Russia's reluctance to reserve the Mayak 
facility for plutonium extracted from dismantled warheads.43 
The U.S. agreement to help Russia fund the Mayak fissile material storage facility 
is further shaded by Russia's funding shortfalls - another criticism of the CTR program 
which consistently surfaces in this school of thought. For the United States, the Mayak 
facility agreement has been plagued by cost overruns. The U.S. financial investment in 
the project has more than doubled beyond the initial estimated amount and it is expected 
to increase substantially by the time the facility is completed.44 In addition, agreements 
with Russia for a U.S. role in fissile material oversight have yet to be concluded. 
In 1996 the United States and Russia each agreed to fund half, approximately 
$275 million, for the design and construction of the Mayak facility. 45 The Russians, 
however, have consistently defaulted on their share of the payments. If the United States 
decided to proceed with the facility's construction, the costs could increase to more than 
one billion dollars. In 1998 Russia indicated that it also lacked the resources needed to 
package and transport the fissile material to the Mayak storage site; paying for these tasks 
could cost the United States an additional $650 million.46 Russia has also attempted to 
obtain additional funds for other Mayak-related facilities, including a car 
wash, a garage, a bus station and a heating plant that U.S. officials consider overly large 
and non-essential. Some Americans are also concerned about Russia's inability to pay 
43 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenal May 





the operational costs once the Mayak facility is completed. Russian officials estimate 
that it will cost nearly $80 million annually to operate the facility; the United States 
estimates are substantially lower- $12 to $13 million.47 
While the rising cost of the CTR program is a major area of criticism, the majority 
of opposition from the Strong Critics focuses on initiatives that do not appear to directly 
carry forward the nuclear weapons reduction process. Projects such as defense 
conversion efforts and housing for retired Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) officers are 
projects that do not appear to address core problems. Richard Kelly, an independent 
defense analyst, has described the CTR program as a "wasteful and dangerous illusion," 
and has declared that there is no evidence that providing housing for former military 
officers will prevent WMD proliferation.48 
In addition to the housing programs, defense conversion is another area of CTR 
assistance that remains hotly debated in Congress. According to critics such as Michael 
Waller, defense conversion projects more closely resemble foreign aid than defense-
related programs. Critics refer to these non-weapons projects as "mission creep" because 
they continue to broaden the scope of the CTR program. Critics hold that some projects 
I b. . 49 no onger support core o ~ectives. 
Defense conversion projects have failed to demonstrate that they help to prevent 
WMD proliferation. Furthermore, they consume resources that should be directed to 
47 Ibid. 
48 Richard Kelly, "The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous IIIusion," Cato Foreign Policy 
Briefing, No. 39, 18 March 1996. Available Online: http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpb-039.html 
49 Michael Waller, "Loving the Russian Bomb," Insight, 6 December 1999. Available Online: 
http://www.ebird.dtic.mil/Dec 1999/s 199991208loving.htm 
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legitimate defense purposes. These arguments are substantiated in a 1997 GAO report on 
an investigation of 24 defense conversion projects. While these projects consumed $143 
million of the $179.7 million allocated, the GAO was unable to confirm that defense 
conversion had any direct impact on eliminating WMD or other military production 
capacity in the former Soviet Union.50 
Specifically, the GAO found that most efforts were focused on converting 
dormant facilities instead of active production lines. The GAO report indicated that only 
one of the 24 projects reviewed intended to convert a facility that was actively involved 
in WMD production. 51 Furthermore, at least one-third of the projects employed people 
who were no longer actively involved in WMD production. In Ukraine and Belarus, a 
defense conversion project receiving U.S. funds to build housing for retired SRF officers 
involved several firms which had no connection to the weapons industry. 52 
Reports about a 1994 defense conversion project suggest that the inadequacies 
associated with the program have stirred Russian resentment and may have impaired 
U.S.-Russian relations. One of the initial U.S. defense conversion efforts earmarked $20 
million in seed money for U.S. companies proposing civilian ventures with Russian 
WMD manufacturers. As part of this program, one of Russia's most prestigious military 
design bureaus was awarded a contract with a Tennessee-based cola company. The 
DoD's selection of a low-tech bidder as a partner for one of Russia's most technically 
advanced companies irritated many Russian officials, who saw the project not as 
50 U.S. General Accounting Office, "Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts 




mutually beneficial, but as a U.S. effort to emasculate Russia's military and industrial 
strength. One of the industry's top-level managers indicated that he saw a "conspiracy at 
work ... Americans are trying to stop Russia from developing advanced technology."53 In 
addition, the conversion project was expected to employ approximately 50 of the 
company's 6,000 workers - failing to meet one of the primary U.S. CTR goals of finding 
non-WMD employment for large numbers of Russian WMD workers. 54 
D. COMPLETE ADVERSARIES 
The school of Complete Adversaries is grounded in strict opposition to the CTR 
program. It does not advocate any type of U.S.-sponsored denuclearization campaign in 
Russia and other former Soviet republics. This school deems the CTR program a "policy 
divorced from reality" and maintains that the CTR program will ultimately threaten, 
rather than enhance, U.S. national security. 55 This school contends that the CTR is not 
the appropriate mechanism to reduce the WMD proliferation threat from the former 
Soviet Union. Complete Adversaries of the CTR encourage the United States to 
find a new approach that would support political and economic reform in Russia and 
promote positive changes in Russia's international conduct. Until substantial 
improvements are made in these areas, critics maintain, the United States and other 
Western governments should refrain from assisting Russia. 56 
53 
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This school is characterized by its outright dismissal of the CTR program. 
Complete Adversaries do not assess CTR projects according to their individual 
applications and contributions. Instead, the program is judged overall as an ineffective 
means of addressing the WMD proliferation dangers in the former USSR. Like the 
school of Unconditional Supporters, the blanket assessment of the Complete Adversaries 
lacks an ability to provide a nuanced perspective on the CTR program. Whereas the 
Unconditional Supporters are "blind" to the CTR's shortcomings, Complete Adversaries 
are unwilling to acknowledge any successes which can be attributed to the CTR program. 
The position taken by Complete Adversaries is grounded in several major 
criticisms of the CTR program. One of the primary criticisms of the CTR by this school 
of thought is that Russia's nuclear stockpile has increased and that its strategic forces 
have been modernized at the expense of the U.S. taxpayers. "Far from helping reduce 
Moscow's nuclear warhead stockpile, the Clinton Administration has actually expanded 
it by paying for warheads from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine that are transferred to 
Russia ... [while Moscow] forges ahead with clandestine weapons development-helped 
by the United States."57 Michael Waller, executive editor of Demokratizatsiya, contends 
that U.S. defense dollars are being used to dismantle obsolete Soviet equipment, thereby 
reserving Russia's defense budget for strategic modernization programs. 58 For example, 
in 1999, Russian naval officials indicated that the oldest Typhoon-class submarine 
(known as project 941, "Akula"), which had been under repairs at the Sevmash shipyard 
57 Waller, "To Russia With Cash," Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 5, 
No. I, Winter 1997, p. 108. 
58 Waller, "Author's Rebuttal to the Department of State (comments on Waller's 'To Russia With Cash' 
Article]," Demokratizatsiya, p. 128. 
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in Severodvinsk for more than nine years, was expected to return to active service in 
2001. This raised serious doubts as to whether the CTR program would be able to 
dismantle five of the six Typhoon submarines as it had originally planned. Since the 
oldest Typhoon-class submarine (first put into operation in 1981) will re-enter active 
service in 2001, it is highly unlikely that Russia will allow the United States to dismantle 
the newer Typhoon submarines commissioned in the late 1980s. 59 
Even if Russia honors its commitment to dismantle the Typhoon-class 
submarines, it is unlikely that its strategic forces will be substantially reduced. As 
obsolete submarines are dismantled, Russia plans to replace them with an upgraded 
model. The Typhoon is scheduled to be replaced with the new strategic Borey-class 
submarine, a more advanced ballistic missile submarine. In this respect, CTR assistance 
may indirectly serve to accelerate Russia's strategic modernization program, because the 
CTR funds cover expenses that Russia would otherwise have to pay for itself. In 1996, 
the U.S. Secretary of Defense and other U.S. officials toured a Russian shipyard to 
witness the destruction of a Yankee-class submarine using CTR assistance. In the same 
shipyard, Russia's first Borey-class vessel was under construction.60 
Waller has characterized CTR efforts as "under-productive at best and often 
counterproductive."61 According to Waller, "U.S. aid has discouraged reform by abetting 
organized crime and official corruption ... and money intended for dismantling the Soviet 
59 Igor Kudrik, "Delta-IV Put in Service, Typhoon to Join," The Nuclear Chronicle, 14 December 1999. 
Available Online: http://www.bellona.no 
60 Waller, "Loving the Russian Bomb," Available Online: 
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nuclear stockpile is being frittered away while Russia rebuilds its arsenals."62 In 
addition, corruption in both the government and the private sector in Russia has 
discouraged foreign investment, thereby harming efforts to promote democracy and a 
market economy. Reports by Transparency International, a Berlin-based "corruption 
watchdog" organization, have consistently ranked Russia among the world's 10 most 
corrupt nations.63 The organization uses information from surveys and polls concerning 
bribe-taking and other corrupt practices. Complete Adversaries of the CTR maintain that 
the program was unable to effectively operate under these conditions. Russia's internal 
practices are cited as one of the principal factors which have caused the CTR program to 
fail. Former Senator Bill Bradley (Democrat, New Jersey) has added, "Not only do we 
[Americans] fail to influence the course of Russian reform, we actually create an anti-
American backlash built on disappointed expectations."64 
Complete Adversaries of the CTR program are typically criticized for their 
inability and reluctance to overcome the suspicions and mistrust of the Cold War period. 
Recent foreign policy initiatives of Russian President Vladimir Putin nonetheless appear 
to warrant U.S. caution. According to Nikolai Ryzhkov, a senior Russian energy official, 
Putin recently decided to relax restrictions on the export of Russian nuclear materials and 
technologies and to resume trade with countries not subject to full-scale international 
monitoring.65 Over the past several years, reports have indicated that Russia has covertly 
62 Ibid., p. 112. 
63 Jamestown Foundation, "Transparency International Puts Russia on Par With Kenya," The Monitor-A 
Daily Briefing of the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 6, No. 171, 15 September 2000. 
64 Senator Bill Bradley quoted in Michael Waller, "To Russia, With Cash," Demokratizatsiya, p. 142. 
65 Jamestown Foundation, "Russia Goes it Alone to Expand Sale of Nuclear Technologies," The Monitor, 
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transferred missile technology and other materials to Iran and other rogue nations. 
Allegations also indicate that Russian specialists have actively aided Iran in its missile 
development program. In 1998 the Russian government launched an investigation of 
nine companies suspected of violating Russian export laws. Russian companies were 
accused of illegally exporting dual-use technologies connected with WMD production 
and missile delivery systems. The transactions under investigation involved Iran, North 
Korea and Libya.66 The United States responded by applying trade sanctions against 
several of the companies. 
Critics hold that President Putin's unilateral break with international 
nonproliferation efforts and consistent engagement with destabilizing behavior contrary 
to U.S. interests indicate that Russia lacks the dedication and commitment to develop an 
enduring nonproliferation culture. According to the Jamestown Foundation, arms 
control experts in the West "have characterized the Putin decree as a unilateral break with 
international nonproliferation efforts and as a sign of the Kremlin's disregard for a recent 
pledge by the nuclear powers to work toward the full elimination of nuclear weapons."67 
Complete Adversaries of the CTR hold that, without a joint commitment and active 
participation by both the United States and Russia, CTR efforts can do little to curb 
WMD proliferation. In light of Russia's recent foreign policy decisions, Complete 
Adversaries of the CTR urge Congress to immediately terminate CTR-funded initiatives 
66 
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in order to limit both U.S. financial losses and the potential for unintended, dangerous 
consequences. 68 
68 Kelly, "The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion." Available Online: 
http://www .cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-039 .html 
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III. KEY ISSUES OF DISCORD 
Several aspects of the CTR program have remained consistent points of 
contention among the four schools of thought. Most of the disagreements involve 
programs which are supported through CTR funds, yet limit oversight opportunities for 
U.S. officials. The scope of the CTR program, which has expanded to include projects 
that do not directly concern weapons dismantlement, is als.o an.issue.,of significant 
controversy. This chapter examines four key issues associated with the CTR program: 
the transfer of strategic nuclear warheads from the non-Russian nuclear successor states 
(Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) to Russia; the lack of transparency in Russia's fissile 
material operations and warhead dismantlement program; the decentralization of CTR 
responsibilities to U.S. federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Energy, 
and State, among others; and the expansion of CTR programs beyond the realm of WMD 
dismantlement, safety and security. 
A. REMNANTS OF THE SOVIET UNION: FOUR NUCLEAR SUCCESSOR 
STATES 
The first key issue to be investigated is the role that the CTR program played (or 
the extent to which it was a factor) in the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia from the 
three non-Russian nuclear successor states- Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. A central 
argument among the four schools of thought focuses on Russia, which became the sole 
possessor ofthe Soviet Union's strategic nuclear arsenal. 
When the Soviet Union broke apart in December 1991, the United States faced 
the possibility that four independent nuclear weapons states might be formed. There was 
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also the question of which state or states, under international law, would succeed the 
Soviet Union in international rights and responsibilities. For START purposes, 
Washington was concerned about which state or states would have international legal 
responsibility for the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. It was determined by the United 
States that all four successor states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territories 
would have to become signatories to the START agreement. 
The Bush Administration quickly realized that Russia and the United States 
would prefer thatthere be simply one nuclear successor state to the Soviet Union.69 U.S. 
officials noted that monitoring four nuclear states would be more difficult and costly than 
monitoring one. Four nuclear weapons states would also complicate the process of 
controlling nuclear proliferation in the region. Their cash-strapped economies increased 
the potential that these states might sell nuclear weapons, materials, and/or technology to 
proliferant states. Kazakhstan's relationship with the Islamic nations was also an issue of 
concern. Rumors had surfaced indicating that Kazakhstan had sold tactical nuclear 
warheads to Iran. Although Kazakh officials denied the allegations, it was not until all 
nuclear warheads had been transferred to Russia that Russian officials could dispel the 
reports of "loose nukes."70 
European stability was also an issue of concern. Congressional leaders feared that 
the creation of four nuclear successor states would aggravate the region's fragile stability. 
69Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, "Avoiding Nuclear 
Anarchy," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.3, Summer 1997, p. 185. 
70Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington 
D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 143. 
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The presence of nuclear weapons in three non-Russian republics only served to 
undermine their security in several respects. First, nuclear weapons in the possession of 
the non-Russian republics were essentially useless as a deterrent against Russian or other 
foreign aggression. The non-Russian republics did not have independent command and 
control mechanisms, which meant that they could not conduct an independent launch. 
There was also the possibility that Russia would use force against those who refused to 
relinquish the nuclear weapons on their territories. For countries such as Kazakhstan 
which share a border with China, the possession of nuclear weapons could be interpreted 
as a threatening gesture. Most of the newly independent states did not have the 
autonomous military capability to withstand an attack, and the United States had 
indicated that it would not provide security assurances to countries that chose to exist as 
independent nuclear weapons states. 
The security of the non-Russian states retaining nuclear weapons could also be 
threatened in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO. A territory containing 
former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons could appear threatening and become a potential 
target. For Belarus, the consequences of possessing former Soviet nuclear weapons 
during a European conflict appeared even more devastating. Soviet war plans had 
identified Belarus as the likely avenue for an advance from the West.71 If Belarus 
officials believed what Soviet propaganda had repeated for decades about NATO's plans 
to attack its neighbors to the East, they might have also believed that Russia would likely 
execute the Soviet plans which called for the explosion of nuclear weapons on Belarusian 
71 Ibid., p. 130. 
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territory as the primary method of halting the attack. 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also lacked the financial and technical means 
of assuming the status of an independent nuclear weapons state. Since Russia contained 
the bulk of the USSR's nuclear weapons and fissile materials and had the infrastructure to 
maintain and safeguard the weapons, the U.S. Administration was all the more inclined to 
accept Russia's claim to be the natural heir and rightful owner of the nuclear weapons. 
The United States agreed to help Russia transfer the weapons from the non-Russian 
republics with the understanding that these warheads would be dismantled and the fissile 
materials would not be reused in new nuclear warheads. 
Most people in the non-Russian republics were also anxious to rid themselves of 
the nuclear "stigma." The years of nuclear development and testing under Soviet rule 
had created a strong anti-nuclear sentiment. Many people still suffered from the effects 
of the Chernobyl disaster and the Soviet Union's nuclear testing in Kazakhstan. There 
was also concern about the safety of the nuclear arsenal. Much of the stockpile was 
reaching the limits of its service life. Some people feared that if the condition of the 
warheads became too unstable, Russia would refuse to accept them. 
While the three non-Russian republics were committed to becoming nuclear-
weapons-free states, they also shared similar concerns about their newly acquired 
independence. Ukraine and Kazakhstan in particular were concerned about the 
consequences that returning the nuclear weapons might have on their state sovereignty 
and security. Ukraine and Kazakhstan wanted a number of agreements with Russia, 
including recognition of their independence and existing borders, before they would 
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agree to transfer the nuclear weapons. Without the deterrent benefit of nuclear weapons, 
Ukraine also wanted implicit security guarantees that nuclear weapons would never be 
used against it and assurances from the United States that it would be protected if 
threatened by a foreign adversary. 
Critics did not oppose the consolidation of strategic nuclear warheads, but 
objected to using U.S. funds to support an increase in Russian nuclear capabilities. 
Michael Waller, for example, argued that the U.S. defense budget was being used to 
assist in the transfer process, thereby obliging the U.S. taxpayer to increase Russia's 
strategic nuclear arsenal.72 In addition, Russia was to acquire a net gain in its nuclear 
arsenal because Ukraine and Kazakhstan contained a number of nuclear delivery systems 
and accompanying warheads that were not required to be dismantled under START I 
conditions. If all the nuclear warheads were returned, Russia would acquire a net gain of 
strategic warheads that could theoretically be redeployed. For example, Ukraine housed 
approximately 130 SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that were expected, 
but not required to be eliminated under START I, along with approximately 46 SS-24 
missiles that were relatively modem and therefore not included in the current 
disarmament plan.73 In addition, only half of the 104 SS-18s 
deployed in Kazakhstan had to be eliminated under the START agreement.74 
72 Michael J. Waller, "To Russia With Cash," Readers Digest, June 1996 in Demokratizatsiya, The Journal 
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Those who opposed the transfer, such as Michael Waller, also maintained that 
there were flaws in the Clinton Administration's regional security assessment as it related 
to the nuclear weapons.75 Richard Morningstar, special advisor to the President and the 
Secretary of State on assistance to the new independent states at the Department of State, 
had maintained that the existence of four nuclear successor states could threaten U.S. 
security and that the transfer of warheads to Russia would eliminate the threats from three 
of these states. However, Morningstar acknowledged that none of the three non-Russian 
republics had the capability or the desire to be an independent nuclear power. According 
to Morningstar, "The command and control systems in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
were incomplete, at best, without Russian participation."76 Therefore, in their existing 
state, the nuclear arsenals located on the territory of the three non-Russian republics did 
not present a strategic missile threat to the United States or any other country. 
Waller has argued, however, that instead of supporting the transfer of the 
warheads to Russia, the United States should have investigated other options. For 
example, at one point Ukrainian officials wanted to dismantle nuclear warheads on 
Ukrainian territory in cooperation with the United States.77 Critics insist that other 
options, including the one exercised in Project Sapphire - that is, the direct purchase of 
75 Waller, "To Russia, With Cash," p. 108. 
76 Richard Morningstar, "Response from the Department of State [response to Waller's 'To Russia, With 
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fissile materials from the non-Russian states- would have been more consistent with the 
U.S. goal or' preventing nuclear proliferation.78 
Project Sapphire was the first of two cases reported in open sources, in which the 
CTR program was instrumental in the direct purchase of nuclear materials or delivery 
systems from former Soviet republics. In 1994, 600 kilograms of highly enriched 
uranium were transferred from Kazakhstan to the United States. In return for its 
cooperation, Kazakhstan received an undisclosed amount of U.S. financial assistance 
distributed through the CTR program.79 
The second case involved the U.S. purchase of21 MiG-29 Fulcrumjets from the 
republic of Moldova. The fighter jets had a dual capability of carrying nuclear and/or 
conventional weapons. The United States decided to purchase the fighters after learning 
that Iran had inspected the jets and expressed an interest in purchasing them. The United 
States purchased the MiGs in November 1997 for an undisclosed amount. The MiGs 
were delivered to the National Air Intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
near Dayton, Ohio. 80 
While Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus were equally committed to becoming 
nuclear-weapons-free nations, the process of achieving this goal was significantly 
different for each state. The following section briefly reviews some of the principal 
78 William C. Potter, "The Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Challenge," presented before the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Service found in 
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factors which influenced the decision and the process of becoming a non-nuclear 
weapons state. While the U.S. CTR program played an important role in the removal of 
nuclear weapons from the three non-Russian republics, it was not the overriding factor in 
their decisions to relinquish the strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. CTR 
assistance was most instrumental in the case of Ukraine, which held out for larger 
monetary rewards before agreeing to transfer the weapons. All three non-Russian nuclear 
successor states, including Ukraine, signed the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992 and agreed 
to START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty long before implementation of the 
CTR program. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to renounce nuclear weapons 
completely in 1991, before Congress passed the CTR act in December of that year, and 
well before CTR implementation actually began in 1993.81 Despite the prospect ofCTR 
assistance, the fear of international isolation, both political and economic, appears to have 
been the primary decision catalyst.82 For each of the non-Russian nuclear successor 
states, the economic, political and military costs of possession eventually proved too 
high. 
1. Belarus 
Belarus was the first nation that inherited nuclear weapons and the first to 
renounce them formally by ratifying the START I treaty and acceding to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state. For Belarus, status as a 
nuclear weapons state had been costly in all respects and Minsk welcomed the 
81 Waller, "Loving the Russian Bomb," p.IO. Also see Kelly, "The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and 
Dangerous Illusion," p. 7. 
82 Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. vii. 
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opportunity to relinquish the nuclear weapons. Even without the promise of CTR or 
other financial assistance, the decision to become a nuclear-weapons-free state carried 
significant benefits for Belarus. 
Belarus was one of the most heavily armed republics at the time of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. In addition to over 1000 tactical nuclear weapons, Belarus was host to 
81 single-warhead road-mobile SS-25 ballistic missiles and approximately 35,000 
members of the Strategic Rocket Force, the majority of whom were ethnic Russians.83 
The concentration of weapons in Belarus was a function of its geography. 
Centrally located between Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, Soviet political 
ideology defined Belarus as the likely gateway for foreign aggression. According to 
Soviet ideology, which attributed hostile intentions to NATO, an advance by NATO on 
the Soviet Union was likely to come through Belarus. Soviet war plans designated 
Belarus as the forward line of defense, and indicated that an aggressive advance was to be 
halted by the release of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. 84 Therefore, 
in the eyes of key decision-makers in Minsk, the possession of nuclear weapons created 
an unwanted and potentially dangerous security liability. As a nuclear weapons state, 
they reasoned, Belarus was not only a potential target, but was also likely to be a nuclear 
battlefield in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO. 
Belarus did not contest Russia's decision to remove the nuclear weapons from its 
territory. While many factors influenced Minsk's decision, the promise of CTR 
83 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 130. 
84Testimony of Colonel General Anatoly Kostenko, Belarusian Military District Commander, before the 
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assistance was not a significant determinant. Living with the memories and long-term 
effects of the Chemobyl disaster, the Belarusian population had developed a strong 
aversion for anything nuclear and welcomed the opportunity to relinquish the weapons. 
Russia's decision to take the nuclear weapons was also welcomed by the 
legislature and other political officials. A large majority of the Belarusian legislature 
consisted of members of the old communist party. From their perspective, Russia was 
the natural and rightful owner of the nuclear weapons and they felt obligated to support 
this decision. Mitchell Reiss has characterized their attitudes as follows: "If Moscow 
wanted the nuclear weapons back, then back they would go."85 Those who had worked 
for Belarus' independence were equally anxious to have the nuclear weapons removed 
from its territory. To the nationalists, Belarus would not be truly independent until the 
Russian military presence was withdrawn - and when the nuclear weapons left, so would 
the soldiers. 
Unlike Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Belarus was prepared to relinquish the nuclear 
weapons without any financial compensation from Russia for the fissile material. In 
addition, because of Minsk's strong economic dependence and political subservience to 
Russia, security guarantees from the West were not an immediate concern. By May 
1992, Belarus had accepted the "side letters" requiring the non-Russian republics to 
transfer all strategic nuclear warheads to Russia and had signed the Lisbon Protocol that 
made the non-Russian republics parties to START and obligated them to join the NPT as 
non-nuclear-weapon states. 
85 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 135. 
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Despite Minsk's support for the nuclear weapons removal operation, funding 
from the CTR program for dismantlement was slow to arrive, delaying the transfer of the 
weapons for almost a year. Another area of concern was the fate of the 35,000 SRF 
members who supported the nuclear arsenal. Many of the soldiers who remained in 
Belarus would need jobs, and the SRF officers, according to Russian law, could not be 
retired until they were provided with housing. By 1993, approximately $40 million in 
CTR assistance had been approved for strategic weapons' dismantlement, defense 
conversion, and housing for retired SRF officers. 86 
2. Ukraine 
Ukraine's reluctance to freely relinquish possession of the strategic nuclear 
weapons set a significant precedent that would shape the future of CTR assistance and 
arms control agreements in general. By 1992, after diplomatic pressure and political 
isolation had failed to attain ratification of the START I treaty and the Lisbon Protocol by 
the Ukrainian parliament, it became clear to the United States that a nation's nuclear 
weapons policy could not be considered in isolation from its other national goals and 
priorities. For Ukraine, fortifying national independence and creating a viable economy 
were goals that were directly tied to the nuclear weapons issue. 
While most Ukrainians supported the renunciation of nuclear weapons by Kiev, 
the weapons were seen as a means of deterring Russian aggression and preserving 
Ukraine's territorial integrity. The Ukrainian parliament (the Rada) insisted that Ukraine 
would part with its nuclear weapons inheritance only if it could obtain the security 
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guarantees of equivalent value through other means.87 Ukrainian officials also used the 
nuclear weapons as leverage against Russia and the United States to obtain financial 
benefits. Officials insisted that Ukraine's economy needed financial assistance. They 
also wanted financial compensation for the fissile materials from both the strategic 
warheads and the tactical warheads which Russia had already removed. 
While Ukraine continued to assert its goal of becoming a nuclear-weapons-free 
state, it also continued to manipulate the nuclear weapons issue in pursuit of other 
objectives. In November 1992, Ukrainian officials claimed ownership and administrative 
control over the nuclear arsenal. The United States administration feared that 
administrative control would eventually lead to operational control and an independent 
launch capability. 
After a year of intense negotiations involving the United States, Ukraine and 
Russia, on 18 November 1993 the Rada conditionally ratified START I. Despite this 
milestone achievement, the conditions attached by the Rada eliminated the necessary 
agreements which would guarantee the complete removal of nuclear weapons from 
Ukraine and the formal implementation of the START agreement. For example, the 
conditions eliminated the Lisbon Protocol and the "side letters" which required Ukraine 
to become a non-nuclear-weapons state signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and to relinquish all nuclear warheads to Russia. The conditions also reaffirmed 
Ukraine's ownership of the strategic weapons and obligated Russia to provide financial 
compensation for both the tactical and strategic warheads. 
87 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 102. 
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The United States responded by developing the Trilateral Agreement among the 
United States, Ukraine and Russia. The agreement addressed Ukraine's long-standing 
security concerns, financial compensation issues, and the need for a strong economic aid 
package. The Trilateral Agreement satisfied the conditional requirements initially 
applied to the START agreement, and in February 1994, the Rada removed the 
stipulations and ratified the START I agreement in its original form. 
The final hurdle in Ukraine's process of renouncing nuclear weapons -
ratification of the NPT- was achieved in November 1994 under the leadership of the 
new Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma. Dedicated to developing a strong market-
based economy, Kuchma was convinced that membership in the NPT would lead to the 
necessary political and economic integration with the Western nations. Leverage was 
again asserted by the Rada for additional security assurances from the West and a larger 
financial package from the United States. By November 1994 it was clear to Ukrainian 
officials that the benefits of transferring the strategic nuclear weapons clearly outweighed 
any advantage to retaining them. Initial agreements included American, Russian and 
British security assurances, 100 tons of non-weapons-grade uranium for Ukraine's 
nuclear reactors, cancellation of the multi-billion dollar oil and gas debt to Russia, and a 
$900 million dollar pledge in CTR assistance and other financial aid from the United 
States.88 
88 Ibid., p. 120-121. 
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3. Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan's declaration of independence expressed a strong anti-nuclear 
sentiment and implicitly prohibited nuclear testing on its territory. Under Soviet rule, the 
Kazakh people were subjected to more than 50 years of nuclear testing at the 
Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in the northeastern section of the country. Both the 
population and the environment still suffered from the long-term effects of radiation 
exposure. In addition to the testing site, Kazakhstan was also host to over one hundred 
SS-18 ICBMs, each equipped to carry ten nuclear warheads, and a fleet of 40 nuclear-
capable "Bear-H" long-range bombers. 
Kazakhstan was the last of the non-Russian republics to declare its independence. 
President Nazarbayev and the other Kazakh political leaders had given little thought to 
the nuclear weapons issue before the collapse of the Soviet Union; and therefore they 
were reluctant to see the Soviet Union's structures, including the integrated armed forces, 
unravel. Unlike Ukraine, Kazakhstan did not attempt to assert local control of the 
strategic nuclear arsenal on its territory. Instead, the Kazakh leaders adopted a middle-
of-the-road approach to. their nuclear policy and were ambiguous about their intentions to 
relinquish the nuclear weapons to Russia. While committed to Kazakhstan's becoming a 
non-nuclear state, they understood that by stalling, as Ukraine had done, they could gain 
a corresponding amount of leverage and thereby extract greater rewards from the West in 
exchange for giving up the nuclear weapons. Their policy was essentially to postpone the 
removal of the nuclear weapons for maximum benefit. 
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It is unlikely that the Kazakh leaders ever seriously considered the possibility of 
maintaining an independent nuclear force. They did, however, consider the potential 
utility of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes toward China, which they regarded as a 
significant military threat. Their strategic concerns prompted them to seek a nuclear 
deterrent in the form of security assurances under the Russian nuclear umbrella. 
The attractiveness and value of nuclear weapons for Kazakhstan was offset by the 
leadership's perception that the retention of nuclear weapons would increase 
Kazakhstan's diplomatic isolation and deprive it of benefits it might otherwise obtain. 
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was highly influential in Kazakhstan's reassessment 
of its nuclear posture and its decision to renounce nuclear weapons. Baker made a 
persuasive case that Kazakhstan's national security could be more effectivelyachieved 
through economic development and integration in the world economy than through the 
possession of nuclear weapons. 89 He indicated that economic assistance would be 
forthcoming from the United States once Kazakhstan renounced the nuclear weapons on 
its territory. U.S. officials also indicated that Kazakhstan's development of a peaceful 
nuclear energy program would be bolstered through membership in the NPT. 
Kazakhstan had attached less significance to U.S. financial assistance than did 
Belarus and Ukraine. According to a senior Kazakh Foreign Ministry official, CTR 
funds "were not a carrot to remove nuclear weapons," but helped to ease the task of 
removal once the decision to relinquish the weapons was made.90 
89 Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 39. 
90 Ibid., p. 40. 
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CTR assistance from the United States was thus only a minor factor. The primary 
decision catalysts for Kazakhstan's decision to sign the Lisbon Protocol and to adhere to 
the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state resided in the international political climate and 
specific security assurances. The bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance with Russia pledged mutual support, including military assistance, in the 
event that either country was subjected to the aggression of another state. Of equal 
importance was China's reassurance that it had no territorial claims on Kazakhstan.91 
According to President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan's change in policy toward the 
NPT was the result of Russia's security assurances along with U.S. recognition of 
Kazakhstan as an independent participant in the START I process.92 While the Kazakh 
parliament ratified the Lisbon Protocol to START I in July 1992, it was not until 
December 1993 that Kazakhstan became a party to the NPT. The United States pledged 
$85 million in CTR assistance in conjunction with Kazakhstan's adherence to the NPT as 
a non-nuclear-weapon state. 
B. TRANSPARENCY IN NUCLEAR WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT AND 
FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATIONS 
An important part of any arms control process is assurance that agreed upon 
activities are actually taking place. One way to provide this assurance is by increasing 
the visibility or "transparency" of activities through measures such as inspections, joint 
visits, and data exchanges. The second key issue of discord among the four schools of 
thought concerns the level of transparency afforded to U.S. inspectors in Russia's nuclear 
91 Ibid., p. 37. 
92 Ibid.,p.l7. 
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weapons programs. Increasing the level of transparency within these programs remains 
one of the greatest challenges of the CTR program. 
This section focuses on two Russian nuclear programs in which transparency 
measures for U.S. inspectors have been consistently absent- warhead dismantlement and 
fissile material operations. Although the U.S. investment in these programs has well 
exceeded a billion dollars, their future remains uncertain. The GAO has described 
programs which lack transparency as "an inherent cost risk" because of the difficulty in 
determining whether they have achieved their intended purpose.93 Russia's reluctance to 
provide the United States needed access to sensitive nuclear materials and facilities has 
raised questions on how to improve transparency. Some U.S. officials have suggested 
that current CTR assistance should be temporarily suspended until transparency measures 
improve. For example, the GAO suggested that Congress might wish to consider linking 
DoD authority to obligate some or all of the funds that it may provide for constructing a 
fissile material storage facility in Russia to completion of a transparency agreement 
regarding the facility's use. The DoD concurred with the recommendation that 
construction funds should not be completely disbursed unless and until transparency 
measures have been agreed upon.94 While this issue remains one of significant debate, it 
is certain that future support for the CTR program will be highly contingent upon 
transparency agreements. 
93U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats From the 
Former Soviet Union, Testimony of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director of International Relations and 
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the U.S. Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 6 March 2000. GAO!f-SIAD/RCED-00-119. 
94U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenenals 
May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, 13 April 1999. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. 
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In contrast with the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia from the three non-
Russian republics, an endeavor in which the United States and Russia shared a common 
interest and cooperated extensively, Russian officials remain reluctant to involve their 
U.S. counterparts in the actual dismantlement of nuclear warheads. Russia's culture of 
secrecy remains suspicious of cooperation with its former adversary on sensitive national 
security issues. Given that Russia's strategic nuclear forces have fallen behind in the 
"parity race," the Russians are reluctant to disclose information which could deepen their 
strategic disadvantage. According to Andrei Kokoshin, the Russian Security Council's 
former Secretary, "It is extremely important today that we safeguard our independence in 
the field of strategic arms and never 'surrender' Russia's strategic nuclear forces to the 
control of anyone else."95 
From a Russian perspective, the government is not obligated to provide 
transparency measures because it has openly maintained that it does not want, nor does it 
need U.S. assistance in warhead dismantlement.96 However, the United States has noted 
that CTR assistance was used to help complete the strategic nuclear warheads transfer 
from the non-Russian republics, and the United States would like to ensure that those 
warheads were dismantled. Without adequate transparency measures, the United States 
has no independent means to account for the final disposition of these warheads. 
95Kokoshin quoted in indirect discourse in Yury Golotyuk, "Russia Adopts 'Kennedy Criterion'," from 
Nuclear Deterrence Is Possible Even Without Parity With the U.S.," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, Vol. 51, No.7, 17 March 1999, p. 19. 
96 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former 
Soviet Union, Letter Report, June 1994. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. 
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In the absence of adequate transparency measures, some concerned Americans 
have speculated about Russian intentions.97 Critics have argued that that CTR assistance 
has produced a net gain in Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, in that the weapons 
transferred from the three non-Russian republics may be redeployed by Russia. Michael 
Waller, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, a non-governmental 
organization, has argued that Russia's continued modernization of its strategic nuclear 
weapons systems "leads one to conclude that some of these warheads [transferred from 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia] or their components may be redeployed 
against the United States and its allies in the future."98 Waller specifically notes the 
redeployment of a regiment of SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, which 
were transferred from Belarus in late 1996. Despite U.S. expectations that the missiles 
would be destroyed with CTR assistance, Russia elected to redeploy the missiles a month 
after the transfer.99 
While Russia has not sought U.S. help in dismantling its strategic nuclear 
weapons, it has expressed concern about the lack of storage space for fissile materials 
from dismantled warheads and has asked the United States for help in designing and 
constructing a storage facility. Explaining the need for the fissile materials storage 
facility, Russian officials asserted that the lack of available storage space for nuclear 
materials would eventually impede their warhead dismantlement efforts. While the 
97 Selden, "Nunn-Lugar: New Solution for Today's Nuclear Threats," pp. 3-4. Also see Katherine E. 
Johnson, "Sustaining Nuclear Threat Reduction Programs: The 'Bottom-Up' Approach," in Shields and 
Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, pp. 231-250. 
98Michael J. Waller, "Author's Rebuttal to the Department of State [response to his article 'To Russia, With 
Cash']," Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 5, No. I, winter 1997, p. 129. 
99 Ibid. 
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United States has to date spent nearly one billion dollars for the facility, negotiations 
between the United States and Russia have yet to confirm that its activities will be 
transparent enough to provide the United States with assurances that Russia is storing 
only materials from dismantled nuclear warheads and that these materials are not being 
reused to construct new weapons. According to a 1996 GAO report, the failure to reach 
an agreement on transparency may force the United States to choose between curtailing 
support for the facility - after investing hundreds of millions of dollars - or accepting a 
compromised level of access. 100 
The lack of transparency in warhead dismantlement and fissile material storage 
operations also has implications for the U.S.-Russian highly-enriched uranium purchase 
agreement (also known as the "Megatons-to-Megawatts" agreement). The United States 
has committed up to twelve billion dollars to purchase 500 metric tons of reprocessed 
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia over a period of twenty years. The 
agreement was initiated in February 1993 by Major General William Bums (Ret.), head 
of the U.S. Safe and Secure Dismantlement Delegation, and Russian Minister of Atomic 
Energy Viktor Mikhailov. The agreement calls for Russia to convert HEU from 
dismantled nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium (LEU). The LEU is then to be 
purchased by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), which converts the 
LEU to power reactor fuel which it may sell to commercial reactors on the open market. 
The deal calls for Russia to convert no less than ten metric tons of HEU in the first five 
100 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, Report to Congressional Requesters, September 1997. GAO/NSIAD-96-222. 
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years and no less than 30 metric tons annually thereafter. Since 1995, delivery of 
Russian LEU to the United States has proceeded with few delays. By the end of 1998, 
the USEC had purchased 50.5 metric tons ofHEU from Russia, equal to approximately 
2,297 warheads. 101 
Since the United States is not allowed access to Russia's dismantlement facilities 
or fissile material storage facilities, Washington has no assurance that this uranium is 
from dismantled warheads. Officials from the U.S. Department of State have indicated 
that although the origin of the material cannot be verified, it is important that the fissile 
material be removed from an environment in which illicit diversion or theft could occur. 
Critics disagree with this assessment. They maintain that the purpose of the purchase 
agreement was to secure fissile material derived from dismantled warheads, not to 
acquire LEU of unknown origin.102 
Critics also argue that the United States failed, as it has with many of the warhead 
and fissile material agreements, to use the leverage of the HEU purchase agreement to 
achieve greater transparency in Russia's nuclear programs. 103 Critics also contend that 
the HEU agreement does not contain any provisions which prevent Russia from using 
this revenue to produce additional HEU to replace that supposedly converted into LEU 
101 Kent A. B. Jamison, "Russia: Overview of the U.S.-Russian HEU Agreement," CNS Web Page, 
February 1999, Revised and Updated June 1999, pp. 1-7. 
Online: http://cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/russia!fismatlheudeal/heudeal.htm Also see "U .S.-Russian 
Agreement on Highly Enriched Uranium," White House Paper, 31 August 1992. Available Online: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda!factshee/wmd/nuclear/ctr/sandy2.htm 
102 Waller, "Author's Rebuttal to the Department of State [comments on Waller's 'To Russia, With Cash' 
Article], Demokratizatsiya, p. 135. 
103 Statement by Michael Waller to the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Research and 
Development, U.S. House of Representatives, in "House Testimony on Missile De-Targeting," American 
Foreign Policy Council, 13 March 1997. 
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and sold. 104 This circumstance reduces any confidence in the nonproliferation benefit 
that may have been achieved from removing the material from Russia. The HEU 
agreement also fails to contain any stipulations which require Russia to use the revenue 
from the sale to underwrite dismantlement activities or to improve safety and security in 
their nuclear programs. 
Russia's refusal to allow oversight and verification procedures in warhead 
dismantlement and fissile material operations denies the United States the ability to 
effectively evaluate the impact of CTR assistance and has rekindled mistrust and 
reservations about Russian intentions. Russia's policy against foreign observation of 
these key activities has been frequently perceived as an unwillingness to cooperate on the 
part of the Russian government. Critics hold that the CTR program should be used as 
leverage to influence Russian behavior and mandate conditional requirements. They 
advocate terminating program funds if conditional requirements are not met: "continued 
obligation of funds should be conditioned on our ability to audit and verify Nunn-Lugar's 
achievements. Without significant improvements in transparency, the benefits of the 
program can be legitimately questioned."105 
Proponents, on the other hand, contend that the severity of the nuclear threat and 
the risk ofWMD proliferation are so great that the United States must defer to Russia's 
national security concerns about providing the United States with access to sensitive 
104 Waller, "Author's Rebuttal to the Department of State [response to his article 'To Russia, With Cash']," 
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 5, No. I, Winter 1997, p. 135. 
105 Selden, "Nunn-Lugar: New Solutions for Today's Nuclear Threats," pp. 19-20. 
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materials and facilities. Proponents maintain that cooperation in this area can be 
achieved by developing a comprehensive bilateral transparency regime for nuclear 
warheads and fissile materials. One important advantage of a bilateral regime would be 
mutual confidence that agreed reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear forces are 
irreversible. 106 
While Russia continues to refuse CTR assistance in warhead destruction, its 
stance appears to be softening as conditions continue to worsen in Russia's strategic 
arsenal. In September 1999, Russia asked the DOE to expand joint projects aimed at 
securing nuclear fuel. Through the joint efforts, Russia hopes to create a facility to 
dismantle submarine reactors and secure nuclear fuel. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson 
indicated that the Russian proposal incorporates an unusual provision that would provide 
the United States greater access to highly sensitive sites previously barred to foreigners. 
According to Richardson, the Russian proposal followed a rare tour of one of Russia's 
largest and most sensitive nuclear naval bases on the remote Kamchatka peninsula. 107 
C. FEDERAL AGENCIES SHARE CTR RESPONSIBILITIES AND COSTS 
The third issue of discord concerns the agreement to move non-weapons CTR 
programs out of the Department of Defense budget to that of other federal agencies. The 
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 was aimed at the destruction of weapons 
and the prevention of weapons proliferation. When the program began to expand to non-
106 Steve Fetter, "A Comprehensive Transparency Regime For Warheads and Fissile Materials," Arms 
Control Today, January/February 1999. Available Online: 
http://www .armscontrol.org/ ACT /j anfeb99/sfjf99 .htm 
107 Richardson quoted in Judith Miller, "Russia Asks U.S. to Expand Nuclear Cleanup, Even to Secret 
Sites," New York Times, 30 September 1999, p. A9. Also see "Richardson Praised Russians After Nuclear 
Submarine Tour," Washington Times, 4 September 2000, p. 13. 
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weapons-related efforts, congressional support began to wane. The transfer of CTR 
responsibilities to other federal agencies, primarily the U.S. Departments of Energy and 
State, was a means of transferring some of the costs in order to sustain the program under 
its new concept of "defense by other means." While the dispersion of responsibilities 
temporarily appeased critics, in many ways it was counterproductive, causing confusion 
with recipient states, as well as program redundancy and fragmentation or gaps in 
program coverage. According to Rose Gottemoeller, "this 'achievement' has been at a 
major cost to the president's ability to pursue his nonproliferation policy goals." 108 
The support given to the three non-Russian nuclear successor states set an 
important precedent in the allocation of CTR funds that significantly deviated from the 
initial congressional understanding of the program. In return for their willingness to give 
up strategic nuclear weapons - which their governments had already pledged to do when 
they became parties to the START I agreement- the Clinton administration offered the 
three non-Russian republics considerable CTR assistance, including housing for retired 
Strategic Rocket Force officers, environmental cleanup of areas that had been devastated 
by Soviet nuclear testing, and the conversion of former WMD industries to commercial 
enterprises. The administration's expanded use of defense funds was a marked departure 
from the original congressional understanding of the CTR program. Congress had 
originally approved the use of the defense budget to advance U.S. national security 
interests by helping the Soviet nuclear successor states secure and destroy their weapons 
108 Rose Gottemoeller, "Presidential Priorities in Nuclear Policy," in Shields and Potter, Dismantling the 
Cold War, p. 70. 
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of mass destruction. 109 The congressional committees with jurisdiction over the CTR 
program were less enthusiastic than the administation about the expanded approach; and 
in some cases they strongly objected to the use of defense resources for projects that 
more closely resembled foreign aid than defense. 110 
In an effort to preserve the program and regain congressional support, the CTR 
program was restructured in 1996, initially with the Departments of Defense, Energy and 
State. It took several years to find an accepted distribution of responsibilities among 
various federal agencies. Since the initial participation by the DOE and DOS, other 
federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Customs Service, now share responsibilities under the 
CTR umbrella. The DOD primarily retains WMD threat reduction efforts while other 
federal agencies oversee projects characterized as nonproliferation assistance efforts. 
In many cases, the U.S. federal agencies work together to accomplish common 
objectives. While this process may result in a larger pool of resources, the distribution of 
responsibilities is sometimes unclear and confusing. For example, although the 
Department of State has executive responsibility for export control assistance programs, 
all six agencies play a role. The State Department funds and coordinates the programs 
through the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) 
fund and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). 111 Both the NADR and the 
109 United States Public Law 102-228, Title 11-Soviet Weapons Destruction, Sec. 201, Soviet Nuclear 
Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 12 December 1991. 
110 Richard Combs, "U.S. Domestic Politics and the Nunn-Lugar Program," in Shields and Potter, 
Dismantling the Cold War, pp. 50-55. 
111 Scott Parrish and Tamara Robinson, "Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls and Combat Illicit 
Trafficking and Brain Drain," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 113. 
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NDF are subject to different guidelines and controls that limit the types of programs 
which are eligible for funding. Most DOS funding is directed at training programs that 
focus on internal compliance and regulations for trade in sensitive technologies. The 
Department of Commerce also participates in export control programs; however, in most 
cases the DOC must apply for funding from the State Department through the NADR and 
NDF. The DOC also receives funding for export control assistance through the DOD, the 
U.S. Customs Service and the FBI. These programs focus on areas such as licensing 
procedures, regulation development, and industry-government coordination. The DOE is 
also involved in export programs which focus primarily on the nuclear sectors of Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The DOE performs many of the same functions as the DOC, 
including the development of licensing procedures, promoting multilateral standards of 
conduct, and providing English-language training for Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakh 
export control officers. 112 
In addition to export control assistance, the agencies also provide support to 
programs that strengthen border controls and block illicit trafficking, as well as programs 
which combat the "brain drain" ofWMD specialists. The multifaceted, multilateral 
programs provide a wide spectrum of support in the area of nonproliferation. Although 
the DOD is the executive agency for the CTR program, many of the nonproliferation 
efforts receive funding from other authorities. For the most part, the DOD remains 
disengaged from the non-weapons nonproliferation activities. Because the CTR program 
lacks a central controlling agency, the complex array of organizations and funding 
112 Ibid., p. 113. 
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authorities often results in competition, inter-agency turf battles, overlap, and in some 
cases, gaps in program coverage. 113 The multiplicity of agencies and personnel turnover 
also create confusion and program delays with recipient states. In many cases, because of 
the large number of U.S. officials involved in a single program, officials from the 
recipient states are reluctant to form close working relationships. Efforts such as the 
centralization of programs under one agency might facilitate the distribution of funds and 
improve coordination efforts among and within U.S. agencies and recipient states. 
D. EXPANDING THE CTR: "MISSION CREEP" AND "SLIPPERY 
SLOPES" 
The final issue of discord involves the expansion of CTR programs to areas 
beyond the scope of the CTR's core competencies. This problem is typically referred to 
as "mission creep" and "slippery slopes." 114 
"Mission creep" is the extension of CTR programs to areas which do not directly 
address the CTR's core objectives. The most common areas of mission creep involve 
nonproliferation programs that do not directly involve weapons dismantlement programs 
such as providing housing for retired Strategic Rocket Force officers and defense 
conversion projects. "Slippery slopes" represent another form of deviation from the 
central focus, usually because of a preoccupation with small details instead of the broader 
problems. According to its critics, the CTR program's investment in the Mayak fissile 
113 Pete V. Domenici, "Assessing U.S. Dismantlement and Nonproliferation Assistance Programs in the 
Newly Independent States," Senator Domenici addresses the NISNP Conference 11-13 December 1999 at 
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute oflnternational Studies, Monterey, California. 
Comments Available Online: http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/nisnp/ctrconf/spchOI.htm 
114 John W.R. Lepingwell and Nikolai Sokov, "Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and Weapons 
Protection, Control, and Accounting," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. I, Spring 2000, p. 70-72. 
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material storage facility has been plagued by the slippery slope problem. 115 The program 
began as an agreement to share the costs with Russia- with the U.S. share not to exceed 
$275 million- for the design and construction of a fissile materials storage facility for 
dismantled warheads. The project has now expanded to include much of the facility's 
infrastructure, such as roads, a bus station, and a car wash. U.S. involvement has also 
expanded to now include the packaging and transport of fissile materials to the storage 
area, and it may eventually include funding the daily operational costs of the long-term 
storage. 116 
The "mission creep" and "slippery slope" problems reflect the nature of the WMD 
proliferation threats and the flexibility of the CTR mandate. Many of the proliferation 
threats involve areas that are environmentally sensitive and interconnected. Responding 
to a threat in one area may result in the creation or increase of another threat. For 
example, transferring the strategic nuclear warheads from the non-Russian republics to 
Russia and dismantling them increased the quantity of fissile material available for 
potential theft or diversion to a rogue nation or terrorist group. This in tum created the 
need for more secure storage facilities. In addition, because fissile material is potentially 
easier to divert than a warhead itself, the storage sites for fissile material must maintain a 
high level of security and therefore require extensive security upgrades. The elimination 
of strategic submarines is another example of unanticipated complications. 
115 Ibid., p. 70. 
116 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenal 
May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, Letter Report, 13 April 1999. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. 
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A submarine cannot be dismantled without dealing with its components, many of which 
may present greater proliferation risks once removed. Nuclear reactor cores, liquid fuel, 
and solid-fuel motors are all sensitive components that create an additional need for the 
expansion of CTR programs. 
The problems of the Russian economy and its effects on the military also create 
the potential for "mission creep" and "slippery slopes." In some cases, despite the 
extensive level of CTR assistance, the lack of basic essentials creates a proliferation 
hazard. For example, the upgrades at most weapons storage sites included the installation 
of high technology security equipment such as microwave and infrared sensors, security 
cameras and intrusion detection alarms. However, despite the increased level of security 
that this equipment may offer, it is useless if the government cannot pay its utility bills 
and the electricity is shut off. In addition, if the soldiers at the weapons storage sites do 
not have cold weather uniforms, they will likely be reluctant to respond to an alarm 
during the winter. Similarly, if the soldiers are untrained on the equipment, any security 
benefits that it might have provided will be lost. Equipment such as highly sensitive 
monitoring devices may initiate an alarm on a frequent basis. In such cases, when alarms 
or other equipment become a nuisance, the equipment may be simply turned off, again 
losing any potential security benefit it might have been able to offer. 
While the nature of the WMD proliferation threat and the problems of the Russian 
economy may have created a situation in which "slippery slopes" and "mission creep" are 
virtually unavoidable, critics argue that officials involved in the administration of the 
CTR program - both U.S. and Russian - have added to the problem. Critics disapprove 
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of expanding the scope of the CTR program to non-defense-related activities. 117 Many 
argue that the administration set a costly precedent when it "rewarded" the three non-
Russian republics for relinquishing their strategic nuclear warheads to Russia. Critics 
argue that the republics quickly learned that if they refrained from committing to a 
nuclear warheads transfer program, they could use their commitment as leverage in 
exchange for a greater economic package from the United States. A recent review of 
CTR programs indicates that this use of leverage has converted the CTR program into a 
"funding source of first resort" for many support activities. A review of CTR programs 
in Russia and Ukraine indicated that when a problem emerged requiring additional funds, 
host officials tended to seek assistance from the United States before considering if it 
could be handled internally. 118 
Critics assert that the U.S. taxpayers are paying the costs associated with "mission 
creep" and "slippery slopes." To the extent that the curtailment of one threat often 
creates another, this problem may be unavoidable. In other cases, however, closer 
oversight and the restriction of CTR assistance to core objectives could prevent CTR 
funds from supporting projects that can and should be funded by the host nations. The 
problem of "slippery slopes" and "mission creep" is used to corroborate the strongest 
criticism of the CTR program - that it allows Russia to modernize its strategic nuclear 
forces (and other military capabilities) by covering costs that would otherwise have to be 
117 Waller, "Authors Rebuttal to the Department of State," pp. 127-128. Also see Shields and Potter, 
Dismantling the Cold War, pp. 48-49. 
118John W.R. Lepingwell and Nikolai Sokov, "Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and Weapons 
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paid by the Russian government. If the problem of "mission creep" and "slippery slopes" 
is not effectively managed, it may endanger the political viability of the CTR program. 
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IV. THE CTRPROGRAM:. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The public debate in the United States suggests that the CTR's scorecard is 
characterized by clear successes as well as significant shortfalls. Supporters insist that 
the CTR program has been one of the most significant achievements in U.S. foreign 
policy since the end of the Cold War. However, the cost of implementing many CTR 
projects has substantially escalated; and conclusively demonstrating, that. these projects 
have supported U.S. national security interests has proven to be difficult. While CTR 
program shortfalls are often more readily apparent than successes, there is considerable 
agreement among the schools of thought surveyed in this thesis that the United States 
must remain at a minimum selectively engaged with Russia on matters which affect the 
national security of the United States and its allies. 
The CTR program has been one of the most useful instruments in this regard. The 
structure of the CTR program necessitates close working relationships. Some of the most 
durable U.S.-Russian relationships have survived periods of high tension between the 
United States and Russia. For example, during the NATO bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia in l~~ia suspended some forms of cooperation with NATO and with 
specific Allies, including the United States. Interactions under the CTR program 
continued, however, even during the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia. 
A. CTR PR~GRAM ADDRESSES FULL SCOPE OF RUSSIAN THREATS 
The CTR program remains a principal source of U.S.-Russian interactions 
regarding WMD proliferation and associated safety and security matters. Evidence 
suggests, however, that neither country has provided enough funding and sustained 
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political attention to make these efforts fully successful. The CTR's successes in 
curtailing the threat of WMD proliferation will remain limited if the program is restricted 
to the weapons arena. The benefits of the CTR can only be fully realized if the program 
employs a broad policy which addresses the full scope of the proliferation crisis. This 
thesis concludes that the CTR program's contributions to countering WMD proliferation 
could be more effectively pursued if the United States enhanced the quality of the CTR 
and worked cooperatively with Russia and the other nuclear successor states of the 
former USSR to address the full spectrum of common interests. 
This thesis finds a wide consensus among observers in the more mainstream 
schools of thought (the Program Advocates and the Strong Critics) thfl.t the CTR 
programs which successfully achieve their goals go beyond an initial agreement on 
shared involvement in the prevention of WMD use and proliferation to encompass full 
cooperation in practical tasks. This requjres a dedicated t:ftofi frvi11 both the United 
States and Russia. However, even with extensive cooperation, the proliferation risks 
cannot be contained until threats to Russia's national security are addressed. In January 
2000, Russia's new Nationfli :;_ecur.ity Concept definPd o·.~ ecnnomic crisis and the social 
and political instability as the principal threats to Russia's national security. 119 
Nuclear proliferation is not a problem that the United States can solve with a 
pigeonhole approach. Evidence suggests that in order to effectively address the threat of 
WMD proliferation, the United States must support democratization efforts in Russia. 
119 "Russia's National Security Concept," A1u.scowNezavisimoyr:: Voennoye Obozreniye, 14 January 2000, 
trans. FBIS Document ID: FfS20000116000515. 
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Sustainable economic prosperity is also an essential condition for long-term prevention of 
WMD proliferation. To fully address the causes of WMD proliferation, the United States 
must adopt a multifaceted approach that brings together perspectives on Russian politics, 
economic reforms, national security, foreign relations and weapons proliferation. "The 
United States must reduce the gap between its pronouncements about the dangers of the 
spread of WMD and its investment of political capital in strengthening nonproliferation 
treaties, institutions, and relationships."120 
B. BEYOND THE NUCLEAR ARENA 
In 1999, the CTR program was officially extended until2006. This extension and 
the yearly CTR budget allocations are subject to the discretion of the U.S. Congress. The 
new Administration, which will take office in January 2001, is likely to be a significant 
influence in determining the extent of future support for CTR and other nonproliferation 
efforts. In addition, while the dangers of WMD proliferation are likely to remain 
indefinitely even if strong U.S. support for CTR continues through 2006, long-term 
support after that date is likely to depend on the existing political and economic 
environment within both the United States and Russia. 
The CTR program's survival, through and beyond 2006, will likely depend on its 
ability to demonstrate and quantify its success. Nonproliferation can be discussed in 
terms of what has been done to help prevent the spread of WMD; however, the success or 
failure of nonproliferation efforts is difficult to ascertain with a high degree of 
120 William C. Potter and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Weapons Spreading," Washington Post, Op-Ed, 28 May 
1999, p. A35, in CNS Reports, Center For Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, June 1999. Available Online: http://www.cns.miis.edu/purb/reports/tuckpot.htm 
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confidence. In light of this difficulty, proponents of the CTR program may seek to justify 
its continuation by identifying additional areas that could potentially benefit from CTR 
assistance. Some advocates have considered the potential for the CTR program to 
expand beyond the WMD arena. For example, the dismantlement of the Russian 
submarine fleet, specifically the non-strategic nuclear-powered submarines, is not funded 
by the CTR program. While Russian officials have requested that CTR assistance be 
provided for this purpose, they have caveated their request by emphasizing that the 
dismantlement of newer strategic submarines, an effort eligible for funding by the CTR 
program, will not be authorized prior to the dismantlement of attack submarines and other 
early generation vessels, regardless of the CTR protocol. 121 Conforming to this Russian 
caveat would require changes in the U.S. legislation governing CTR activities. 
The expansion of the CTR program to support the dismantlement of non-strategic 
submarines is an example of what critics have condemned as "the evolutionary trend 
towards 'mission creep' .... " 122 Critics have maintained that non-weapons programs will 
erode support for the CTR program as a whole. It is not clear whether (or to what extent) 
"mission creep" must be tolerated in order to pursue the long-term benefits of preventing 
proliferation. 
C. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS UNDERMINE CTR PROCESS 
U.S.-Russian disagreements about major international events in recent years have 
weakened the U.S.-Russian cooperative relationship and threaten to undermine the 
121 Igor Kudrik, "International Cooperation Radiation Safety in the Russian Navy," The Nuclear Chronicle 
From Russia, 28 February 1999. Available Online: http://www.bellona.no 
122 Ellis, "Nunn-Lugar's Mid-Life Crisis," p. 100. See also Lepingwell and Sokov, "Strategic Offensive 
Arms Elimination and Weapons Protection, Control, and Accounting," p. 70. 
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nuclear nonproliferation system. Russia responded to some of these events by 
temporarily suspending certain forms of cooperation with the United States and other 
NATO allies. Russia's reactions to these events confirm the importance of its nuclear 
arsenal for security and prestige. Russia's continued cooperation in nuclear threat 
reduction efforts reinforces the conclusion that an effective nonproliferation policy can 
no longer address the nuclear agenda as an isolated issue. 
Russia's response to NATO's 1999 bombing campaign against Yugoslavia 
included a change in its nuclear agenda. Russia was outraged, and characterized NATO's 
use of force as "undisguised aggression." 123 Russia responded by suspending certain 
forms of cooperation with the United States and other NATO countries and by halting all 
discussion by the Russian parliament of ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START) II treaty. For Russia, NATO's actions set a dangerous precedent, in that 
NATO had used force without the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council. 
Russia's perception of NATO;s actions is reflected in its January 2000 National Security 
Concept. The 2000 National Security Concept expresses Russia's perception that NATO 
uses force freely and will not hesitate to use it against Russia over political 
disagreements. "NATO's transition to the practice of using military force outside its 
zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the 
entire global strategic situation." The 2000 National Security Concept also acknowledges 
that at the present time, operational and combat training in the Armed Forces of the 
123 Boris Yeltsin quoted in Sevodnya, 25 March 1999, in "NATO Strikes Serbia, Russia Is 'Outraged'," The 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No. 12, April 1999, pp. 1-2. 
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Russian Federation are at a "critically low level." The National Security Concept 
indicates that the Russian Federation "envisages the possibility of employing military 
force to ensure its national security." The doctrine specifies: "the use of all available 
forces and assets, including nuclear weapons, in the event of need to repulse armed 
aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and 
have proven ineffective." 124 
Although U.S.-Russian relations soured over NATO's bombing operation, 
cooperative efforts under the CTR program effectively remained unchanged. A visit by 
General Thomas Kuenning, a leading CTR official, was initially cancelled when the 
bombing campaign began. The visit was quickly rescheduled after Russian authorities 
apparently decided that the CTR program was "too important to be sacrificed out of 
solidarity with the Serbs." 125 The CTR program's ability to continue operations during 
periods of high tension is a good indication that both the United States and Russia 
recognize that the CTR program offers significant advantages for both countries and that 
it is in their best interest to sustain the program. According to a Russian journalist 
specializing in international security matters, "the obvious benefits deriving from the 
Nunn-Lugar program are a good guarantee that it will be the last program to be shut 
down if relations continue to deteriorate, and the first to be revived as soon as another 
warming trend arrives in relations between Moscow and Washington." 126 It is also a 
124 
"Russia's National Security Concept," Moscow Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 14 January 2000, 
trans. FBIS Document ID: FTS200001 16000515. 
125 Pavel Felgengauer, "How to Pillory an 'Aggressor' and Still Get Money Out oflt," Sevodnya, 21 May 
1999, in The Current Digest ofthe Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No. 20, June 1999, p. 19. 
126 Ibid. 
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good indication that if relations again deteriorated, the CTR program will likely be the 
last to shut down and the first to be revived once relations improved. 
For Russian officials, the advantages of ratifying the START II treaty were not as 
easily recognized as those of the CTR program. It was nearly a year after NATO's air 
campaign against Yugoslavia before the Russian parliament (Duma) agreed to reconsider 
the START II treaty. After more than seven years of delays, the Duma finally approved 
ratification of START II on 14 April2000. After the upper house of parliament approved 
the resolution of ratification on 19 April, it was signed by President Vladimir Putin on 4 
May 2000. The central importance of START II was that it opened the path for further 
nuclear weapons reduction negotiations between Russia and the United States under 
START III. Russia's ratification of START II was also intended to prevent the United 
States from withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which 
prohibits the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). The Duma's resolution of 
ratification included a conditional provision which requires the United States to ratify the 
1997 ABM Treaty demarcation agreement before START II can enter into force. The 
provision reaffirmed Russia's position, which has maintained a strong link between the 
ABM treaty and continuation of the START process. 
Russia's ratification of START II presented an international image of Russia as 
the leading proponent of nuclear threat reduction. A subsidiary purpose of ratification 
was to provide Russia leverage on two additional issues of contention: NMD and the 
enlargement of NATO. The strong link which Russia has maintained between its nuclear 
arsenal and decisions about NMD and NATO enlargement sends a message to 
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Washington and Brussels: these issues must not be considered in isolation from Russian 
interests. In Russian eyes, the nuclear arsenal is the last guarantee of Russia's state 
sovereignty. Given the weakened state of its conventional forces, it is unlikely that 
Russia will agree to further reduce its nuclear arsenal if it feels threatened by the NMD or 
NATO enlargement projects. 
In addition, each additional crisis threatens to further weaken the U.S.-Russian 
relationship. According to Senator Richard Lugar, "Each succeeding crisis and 
subsequent efforts at restabilization of the relationship has come at the cost of lower 
levels of trust and confidence which, in tum, provide more fertile ground for the seeds of 
the next crisis."127 Although the CTR program survived the antagonism created by the 
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the cooperative relationship created under the CTR 
program may be weakened by future crises. The importance of the U.S.-Russian 
relationship will no doubt be considered as part of the NMD and NATO enlargement 
decision-making processes. 
D. BUILDING A NONPROLIFERATION CULTURE 
As projects in the non-Russian republics come to fruition, the focus may 
gradually shift to Russia exclusively. While additional U.S. resources will likely be 
available, the Russians can expect the United States to require closer oversight and 
increased transparency. Many projects in weapons dismantlement and fissile material 
security require continued emphasis and CTR-sponsored support. A major commitment 
127 Senator Richard Lugar addresses the Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Assessing U.S. 
Dismantlement and Nonproliferation Assistance Programs in the Newly Independent States," Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies: Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Conference, 11-13 December 1999. 
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by Russia to actively participate and support the objectives is mandatory. Along with 
greater transparency in warhead dismantlement and fissile material storage activities, 
Russia will need to provide the United States and other donor states with positive 
assurances that it is not participating in the transfer of nuclear technologies or weapons 
expertise or otherwise contributing to WMD proliferation. 
Another area of concern is Russia's dedication to sustain nonproliferation 
programs once U.S. assistance is terminated. This thesis identifies a common theme in 
the analytical literature: the risk that if Russia fails to develop an enduring "safeguard 
culture," much of the CTR assistance will prove to have been to no avail. An enduring 
safeguard culture will require a strong commitment from Russia, along with the resources 
to sustain the CTR-initiated programs once U.S. assistance is discontinued. Currently, 
U.S. assistance under the CTR program is scheduled to terminate in the year 2006. 
Russia's current financial crisis means, however, that Moscow may find it difficult to 
maintain nonproliferation programs without external assistance. 
The United States can help Russia build a safeguard culture by working 
cooperatively to implement sound economic reforms that will build a strong market 
economy. In this respect, it is imperative that current assistance from the United States 
be dedicated to more than nuclear threat reduction. The United States can help Russia 
and the other Soviet successor states develop their economies by focusing current and 
future aid programs on building self-sustainable, non-military industrial enterprises in the 
former Soviet Union. CTR efforts should support WMD-focused activities that decrease 
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the long-term threat as well as the economic pressure to continue to produce and market 
WMD-related technologies. 
Non-weapons-focused assistance programs will, however, be difficult to sell to 
the U.S. Congress, which has already questioned many projects that do not directly 
support weapons dismantlement. Thus, if Russia is to build an enduring WMD safeguard 
culture that actively supports nonproliferation projects of its own, the United States must 
begin to instill the importance of this culture among the leaders of both countries. A 
safeguard culture dedicated to the containment of WMD proliferation is in the best 
interests of both Russia and the United States. As a long-term investment in countering 
the threat of WMD proliferation and the potential for WMD terrorism, the years of CTR 
assistance that remain must be focused on helping Russia implement appropriate political 
and economic reforms that will enable Russia to successfully achieve and sustain a 
safeguard culture in the future. 
82 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ................................................................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library .............................................................................................. 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Captain Fredrick Rocker, USN, Code NS/PL. ........................................................ 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5218 
4. Professor David Yost, Code NS/YO ....................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5218 
5. Professor Mikhail Tsypkin, Code NSffK ............................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5218 
6. Thomas Skrobala ..................................................................................................... 1 
Nebraska A venue Complex 
Strategic Systems Programs 
Naval Treaty Implementation Program (SP2025) 
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20393-5446 
7. Gerald R. Baird Jr. ................................................................................................... 1 
Nuclear Programs Division 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
6801 Telegraph Road 
Alexandria, VA 22310-3398 
8. Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Preston, USAF ...................................................... 1 
HQ USAF/XONP 
1480 Air Force Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20330-1480 
83 
9. Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Boyd, USAF ........................................................... 1 
DTRA/ AS/ ASCO 
8725 John J. Kingman Road- MS6201 
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201 
10. Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency .............................................. 1 
7150 Heller Loop, Suite 101 
Springfield, Virginia 22150-3198 
11. Major Stacy Ann Grams .......................................................................................... 2 
13340 West Dakota Street 
New Berlin, WI 53151 
84 
